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TEN YEARS AFTER: A RECONSIDERATION
OF THE CODIFICATION OF EVIDENCE
LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS
JEREMIAH

F.

HEALY III·

INTRODUCTION

On December 30, 1982, by a divided vote, the Justices of the Mas
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected a codification of evidence
law for Massachusetts. 1 That rejection of the Proposed Massachusetts
* A.B., Rutgers College; J.D., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, New Eng
land School of Law. The author wishes to thank the men and women who made this
sabbatical project possible, including the Honorable James R. Lawton, Chairman of the
Board of Trustees of the New England School of Law; Dean John F. O'Brien, Dean of the
law school; my colleagues, on the faculty and elsewhere, who contributed valuable com
ments on earlier drafts of this Article; and Barry Steams, Reference Librarian of the law
school, for his invaluable help in locating documents which supported this effort.
1. Announcement Concerning The Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (SJC
2787, Dec. 30, 1982) [hereinafter SJC Announcement], reprinted in KENNETH B. HUGHES,
MASSACHUSETfS PRACTICE app. I at 508 (William G. Young et al. eels., Supp. 1992).
Since the action of the Supreme Judicial Court was by way of announcement rather than
reported decision, the text of the court's explanation for rejecting the proposal is neither in
the Massachusetts nor North Eastern Reporter systems and accordingly is difficult to ac
cess easily. For ease of reference in using this Article, the following is the entire text of the
SJC Announcement:
On November 22, 1976 the Supreme Judicial Court, upon the request of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the Presidents of the Massachu
setts and Boston Bar Associations, appointed an advisory committee to consider
whether the Massachusetts rules of evidence should be codified or promulgated.
In July of 1980 the advisory committee transmitted proposed Rules of Evidence
to the [c]ourt.
The Justices received briefs and comment from numerous parties and bar
associations concerning the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Oral ar
guments were heard on September 9, 1982. The Justices express their apprecia
tion for the efforts of the advisory committee and the Reporters who worked on
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Rules of Evidence2 left the commonwealth a "common-law" evidence
state with many statutory accretions and adjustments. Since that re
jection, at least two important events have occurred. First, both state
and federal courts have cited, discussed, and occasionally adopted in
dividual portions of the proposed Massachusetts rules. 3 Second, a
these Proposed Rules, as well as to the various parties who have submitted their
comments and briefs. The Justices have given careful consideration to the views
expressed.
The Justices recognize that if the Proposed Rules were to be adopted, (1)
there would have to be careful coordination with the Legislature to repeal, revise,
or modify many statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence;
(2) many of the Proposed Rules involve departures from the principles set forth in
the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) some of the Proposed Rules are subject to
significant and arguably valid criticisms.
. A majority of the Justices conclude that promulgation of rules of evidence
would tend to restrict the development of common-law principles pertaining to
the admissibility of evidence. The valid objective of uniformity of practice in Fed
eral and State courts would not necessarily be advanced because the Proposed
Rules, in their present form, depart significantly from the Federal Rules of Evi
dence. Additionally, in the view of some of the Justices of [sic] the Federal Rules
of Evidence have not led to uniform practice in the various Federal courts and
are, in some instances, less well adapted to the needs of modem trial practice than
current Massachusetts law. Accordingly, a majority of the Justices have con
cluded that it would not be advisable to adopt the Proposed Massachusetts Rules
of Evidence at the present time. The Proposed Rules have substantial value as a
comparative standard in the continued and historic role of the courts in develop
ing principles of law relating to evidence. Parties are invited to cite the Proposed
Rules, wherever appropriate, in briefs and memoranda submitted.
Id. at 508-09.
2. Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as Prop. Mass. R.
Evid.], reprinted in 8 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1231 (1980) (note corrections made at 8 MASS.
LAW. WKLY. 1289 (1980», and in JOHN J. McNAUGHT & J. HAROLD FLANNERY, MAS
SACHUSETTS EVIDENCE: A COURTROOM REFERENCE (1988 & Supp. 1992). Unfortu
nately, the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence themselves were never published in
the typical reporters. The full text of the proposed rules was set forth in the Massachusetts
Lawyers Weekly. An accessible current source for the rules is McNAUGHT & FLANNERY,
supra. That looseleaf volume, published by MCLE, Inc., contains the SJC Announcement
and the proposed rules with advisory committee notes. Id. at A-I to A-86. The authors
conveniently include citations, categorized by specific rule number, to the proposed rules in
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and (intermediate) Massachusetts Appeals Court
opinions. Id. at B-1 to B-lO.
Another source for the proposed rules is KENNETH B. HUGHES, MASSACHUSETTS
PRACTICE (William G. Young et al. eds., Supp. 1992). In the 1992 supplement, new edi
tors William G. Young, John R. Pollets, and Christopher Poreda provide the SJC An
nouncement and the proposed rules with advisory committee notes. Id. at 508-90. Those
editors also try to organize (under the heading "Massachusetts Evidentiary Standards") the
common-law and statutory evidence precepts of the commonwealth using the organiza
tional format of the Federal and Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1-95.
Another source that uses the proposed rules is PAUL J. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MAS
SACHUSETTS EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985). Chief Justice Liacos refers to the
proposed rules in his main text discussion of common-law and statutory evidence precepts.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 98-233.

1993]

CODIFICATION OF EVIDENCE LAW

3

great many more jurisdictions have adopted a "code" form of evi
dence. 4 In addition, current litigation conditions suggest that a codi
fied system of evidence would advance the cause of justice in all
Massachusetts forums. S
Accordingly, in this tenth anniversary year of the rejection of the
proposed Massachusetts rules, a reconsideration of the codification ef
fort and process is appropriate. Part I of this Article will recount the
history of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence project.
Part II of this Article will chronicle the experience of Massachusetts
courts in using the proposed rules since their rejection. Part III will
review codification movements in other states since 1982. Part IV will
explore reasons why codification would improve the administration of
justice in the courts of the commonwealth. Part V of this Article will
identify some remaining issues regarding codification.
I.

THE PROPOSED MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF EVIDENCE
PROJECT

On November 22, 1976, the Supreme Judicial Court appointed an
advisory committee to consider whether the evidence law of the com
monwealth should be codified. 6 The appointment was made at the
request of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the Presi
dents of the Massachusetts and Boston Bar Associations. 7 The court
also may have been influenced by the impact of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which became effective the previous year. 8
The original chairman of the committee was a Massachusetts Su
perior Court judge, the Honorable A. David Mazzone. 9 Upon Judge
Mazzone's elevation to the federal bench, the Honorable John E. Fen
ton, Jr., then a member of the Massachusetts Land Court (and now
the Chief Administrative Justice of the Trial Court Department), suc
See infra text accompanying notes 234-313.
See infra text accompanying notes 314-432.
SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
7. Id. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended the Uniform Rules of
Evidence in 1974 to parallel the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. UNIF. R. EVID.
(1974).
8. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. 733 (1988».
A comprehensive discussion of the federal codified rules and the Massachusetts common
law system appeared in 1975 as well. See James M. Hughes et aI., Comparison of the New
Federal Rules ofEvidence and Rules ofEvidence Applied in Massachusetts Courts, 60 MASS.
L.Q. 125 (1975).
9. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE PROPOSED MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF EVI
DENCE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1980) [hereinafter ADVISORY
COMMITTEE HISTORY], reprinted in HUGHES, supra note I, at 509.
4.

5.
6.
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ceeded him.1O The original reporter of the committee was Professor
Richard H. Field, professor emeritus at Harvard Law Schoo1. 11 Upon
Professor Field's untimely death, Professor Charles M. Bumim of Suf
folk University Law School succeeded him.12
Under Judge Fenton and Professor Bumim, the advisory commit
l3
tee reported on its work and conducted a forum at the annual meet
ing of the Massachusetts Bar Association in June, 1978, where it
received comment on its draft set of rules. 14 In July, 1980, the com
mittee submitted to the court a set of rules based mainly upon the
Federal Rules of Evidence and partly upon the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence (as suggested by the United States Supreme Court
but not enacted by Congress), IS the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
other codifications. 16 The full text of the Proposed Massachusetts
Rules of Evidence and advisory committee's notes were published in
the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly shortly thereafter,l7
An exhaustive analysis of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of
Evidence themselves is beyond the scope of this Article. ls However,
some discussion of the proposed Massachusetts rules is essential to an
understanding of the court's later declination of the rules.
Initially, the advisory committee "adopted as a working policy
the acceptance of [a] federal rule [of evidence] as a starting point, with
a departure from the federal rule to be made only when reasons of
policy or of well-established Massachusetts practice dictated other
wise."19 As a result, there were many proposed Massachusetts rules
that were identical to their federal counterparts and which either
10. Id. Judge Mazzone continued to serve the committee as a consultant even after
he moved to the federal court. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 457
(1983).
11. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at first page (unnumbered).
12. Id.
13. The other members of the advisory committee were the Honorable Lawrence D.
Shubow, Vice Chairman; Attorneys Richard W. Renehan, Secretary, Richard D. Gelinas,
and John F. Keenan; Senator Alan D. Sisitsky; and Professor Stephen N. Subrin of North
eastern University School of Law.
14. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second page (unnumbered).
IS. See infra text accompanying notes 250-67.
16. Assembling the proposed Massachusetts rules was an exhausting task, as chroni
cled by the committee. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second through
fourth pages (unnumbered).
17. See supra note 2.
18. The arguments in the brief of the Boston Bar Association alone ran for 70 pages.
See generally, Brief for the Boston Bar Association, In re Proposed Mass. Rules of Evi
dence (1982) [hereinafter BBA Brief]. Again, references to the proposed rules are con
tained in the analyses of their common-law counterparts in LIACOS, supra note 2.
19. ADVISORY COMMITIEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at first page (unnumbered).
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would not have changed existing Massachusetts evidence law 20 or
would have changed existing law for the better. However, as the com
mittee reviewed its efforts, it became persuaded that "at times ... the
... federal rule, examined in the light of developing case law, was not
necessarily sound."21 As a result, there were many situations in which
the advisory committee departed significantly from federal counter
parts. Some examples of these departures, traced article by article
through the proposed rules, demonstrate this point.
Article I ("General Provisions") and Article II ("Judicial No
tice") closely parallel the actual federal rules.22 However, Article III
("Presumptions") is radically different from its federal counterpart.
In Federal Rule 301, the effect of a presumption is merely to shift the
burden of production of the presumed fact to the party not carrying
the burden of persuasion. 23 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 301, how
ever, shifts the burden of persuasion on the presumed fact to the party
opposing the presumption. 24 As well as effecting a substantial change
in Massachusetts law,25 the change would cause a significant impact in
those federal court cases where the state rule would be "borrowed. "26
20. BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 4-5.
21. ADVISORY CoMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at second page (unnumbered).
22. Proposed Rule 101 ("Scope [of the Rules]") was modified to fit a state court
context. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 101 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 104 ("Preliminary Questions") contained two departures from the fed
eral rule. First, part "(a)" was modified with respect to findings by the trial judge on the
existence of a conspiracy and on motions to suppress evidence. Second, a new subdivision
"(f)" was added with respect to criminal defendants contesting dying declarations and con
fessions. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 9.
23. FED. R. EVID. 301. This is the so-called "Thayer view" or "bursting-bubble
view" of a presumption. For the evolution of FED. R. EVID. 301, see infra text accompa
nying notes 259-63.
24. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 301(a), supra note 2. This is the so-called "Morgan view"
of presumptions and was the thrust of the original proposed version of Federal Rule 301 as
submitted by the United States Supreme Court to Congress, but rejected by the federal
legislature in favor of Federal Rule 301 as enacted. See FED. R. EVID. 301 advisory com
mittee's note; Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (1972) [hereinafter 1972 Proposed Federal
Rules]; Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 207 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Proposed Federal
Rules].
25. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 11-15.
26. Federal Rule 302 provides that "[i]n civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which state
law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with state law." FED. R.
EVID. 302. While, typically, Federal Rule 302 applies in diversity of citizenship claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988), the federal court will also look to state presumption law in
what used to be called "pendent" or "ancillary" claims and what are now known as "sup
plemental subject matter jurisdiction" claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1990). See
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The proposed Massachusetts rule also departed from the Federal
Rules of Evidence in providing for "prima facie evidence"27 and pre
sumptions in criminal cases. 28
Proposed Article IV ("Relevancy and Its Limits") was relatively
faithful to the then-existing 29 Federal Rules of Evidence. Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 404 ("Character Evidence") omitted the subpara
graph permitting a criminal defendant (and the prosecutor in rebuttal)
to offer evidence of the pertinent character trait of the victim of a
crime. 30 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 406 ("Habit: Routine Prac
tice") was somewhat more restrictive of habit and routine practice
evidence than its federal counterpart. 31 However, Proposed Massa
chusetts Rule 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise") was
somewhat more protective of settlement offers than its federal counter
part. 32 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 410 adopted the 1975 version,
rather than the 1979 version, of Federal Rule 410. 33 Finally, with re
spect to Article IV, the advisory committee did not provide for a sepa
rate rule of evidence to parallel Federal Rule 412 concerning rape
victims. 34
The most troubling aspect of the proposed Massachusetts rules
generally, Arthur D. Wolf, Codification 0/ Supplemental Jurisdiction: Anatomy ofa Legis
lative Proposal, 14 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1992).
27. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 301(b), supra note 2.
28. Id. at Rule 302.
29. Federal Rule 404(b) was recently amended to require the proponent of prior bad
acts evidence to give notice to an opponent in advance of trial of the proponent's intention
to offer evidence of other bad acts for one of the purposes permitted under subparagraph
"(b)". FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (effective Dec. 1, 1991).
30. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 404(a), supra note 2. Apparently, the advisory committee
was concerned that, beyond the rape-victim protections provided for in MASS. GEN. L. ch.
233, § 21B (1990), and self-defense considerations developed through the common law, the
victim subparagraph in Proposed Rule 404(a) would inappropriately expand admissible
evidence in a criminal case. See Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 404 advisory committee's note,
supra note 2; BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 19.
31. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 406, supra note 2. Proposed Rule 406(a) would exclude
habit or routine practice evidence on the issue of negligence, and Proposed Rule 406(b)
would require habit or routine practice to be proved by numerous specific instances of
conduct (as opposed to reputation or opinion evidence). See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at
21-22. For a discussion of the committee's reasons for the restrictions, see Prop. Mass. R.
Evid. 406 advisory committee's note, supra note 2.
32. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 408, supra note 2. Proposed Rule 408 contained language
to protect offerors of settlement who were co-defendants, third-party defendants, and even
non-parties to the lawsuit. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 23.
33. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 24. FED. R. EVID. 410 (amended by Pub. L.
No. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (1979) (effective Dec. 1, 1980».
34. This omission was probably because of existing Massachusetts statutory law on
the admissibility of the past sexual behavior of an alleged rape victim. See MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 233, § 21B (1990).
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involved Article V ("Privileges"). In fairness, the advisory committee
was in a no-win situation with respect to codifying privileges. On the
one hand, the detailed codification of the federal rules regarding privi
lege submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court 35 had been rejected
by Congress in favor of a single provision, telling the federal courts to
develop privilege in a common-law manner and to look to state privi
lege law where directed. 36 Thus, the Massachusetts advisory commit
tee had no authoritative federal rules to copy. On the other hand, the
Supreme Judicial Court has always been very deferential to the Massa
chusetts legislature on the recognition of privileges. 37 Caught in this
dilemma, the advisory committee endeavored to structure codified
privilege rules for Massachusetts drawn substantially from the Pro
posed Federal Rules of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evi
dence. 38 In so doing, the committee basically adopted the restrictive
wording of Proposed Federal Rule 501 and Uniform Rule 501, and
deleted Proposed Federal Rule 502 as redundant. 39 The committee
then proceeded to respect certain existing Massachusetts statutory
privileges and to challenge others. 40
Regarding the individual proposed rules on privilege, Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 502 ("Lawyer-Client Privilege") chose as its defi
nition for "representative of the client" the restrictive "control-group"
test.41 The committee suggested that this provision might be the most
controversial within the proposed rule,42 mainly because the provision
was taken from the uniform rule model,43 and no such definition was
contained in the proposed federal rule. 44 More significantly, within a
See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 413-46 (Rules 501-06).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 501. See infra text accompanying notes 264-67 for a discus
sion of the evolution of Federal Rule 501.
37. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983) (de
ferring to the legislature on the issue of a parent-child privilege), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984).
38. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 501 advisory committee's note, supra note 2.
35.

Id.
Id.
41. Id. at Rule 502(a)(2) advisory committee's note. The control-group test extends
the circle of confidentiality between lawyer and client to those persons who have "authority
to obtain professional legal services or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf
of the client." Id. at Rule 502(a)(2). See also City of Philadelphia V. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962), mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom
General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943
(1963).
42. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(2) advisory committee's note, supra note 2.
43. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2) (1974).
44. Proposed Federal Rule 503 contained no definition of "representative of a client"
because the federal advisory committee preferred to leave that definition, somewhat disin
39.

40.
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year, the United States Supreme Court would reject the control-group
test definition of "representative of a client" as too restrictive for the
attorney-client relationship.45 Somewhat overlooked in the contro
versy were the positive changes the proposed Massachusetts rules
would have brought to the attorney-client relationship in the common
wealth, such as broadening the definition of "client" to include organi
zations as well as natural persons,46 broadening the definition of
"lawyer" to include those a client reasonably believes to be licensed to
practice,47 and broadening the definition of "confidential" to include
within the privilege those communications that the client intended to
remain confidential even if an eavesdropper overheard them. 48
Unfortunately, other privileges proposed for codification were
also controversial. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503 ("Psychothera
pist-Patient Privilege") challenged the existing statutory privilege49 in
numerous respects, with the advisory committee implicitly calling for
the repeal of that statute. 50 Proposed Massachusetts Rule 504 ("Hus
band-Wife Testimonial Privilege and Disqualification") would have
slightly expanded the beneficial and traditional privilege regarding un
favorable testimony in a criminal case, with the witness-spouse being
genuously, to "common-law development." See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note
24, at 361-62 (Rule 503 and advisory committee's note).
45. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). As a result of the Upjohn
decision, the National Conference amended the Uniform Rule to conform to the Supreme
Court's standards in Upjohn. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2) (1986).
46. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(I), supra note 2.
47. Id. at Rule 502(a)(3). This is particularly important in light of the inconsistency
of the Supreme Judicial Court in interpreting definitions within statutory privileges. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Collett, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1226 (Mass. 1982), the court
expansively defined "persons consulting" a social worker within the social worker privilege.
See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § l35A (1990). However, in Commonwealth v. Man
deville, 436 N.E.2d 912, 922 (Mass. 1982), the court narrowly defined "psychotherapist"
within the patient-psychotherapist privilege. See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B
(1990). Interestingly, the court in Mandeville included a footnote conceding that "Rule
503(a) of the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence might well produce a different
result in this case." Mandeville, 436 N.E.2d at 923 n.ll. See a/so Collett, 439 N.E.2d at
1229 n.4. See generally Jeremiah F. Healy III, Case & Statute Comments: Evidence
Privileges-Psychotherapist-Reporter-Socia/ Worker, 68 MASS. L. REV. 83 (1983).
48. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(5), (b), supra note 2 ("A client has a privilege to ...
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications.").
49. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B (1990).
50. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 503 advisory committee's note, supra note 2. The commit
tee also included the following in its Advisory Committee History: "The members [of the
committee] working on Article V spent endless hours attempting to draft a working rule
which would accommodate the existing Massachusetts statutes on the psychotherapist and
social worker privileges, a task compounded by a belief that the existing statutes created
more problems than they solved." ADVISORY COMMITTEE HISTORY, supra note 9, at sec
ond page (unnumbered).
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the holder of the privilege. 51 However, Proposed Massachusetts Rule
504 also would have perpetuated the oft-criticized disqualification of
husband and wife as competent witnesses to testify to their "private
conversations"52 and would have expanded that disqualification to
"confidential communications. "53 While many of the other departures
in the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence from the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence on privilege may have been justifiable, 54
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 512 ("Comment Upon or Inference
from Claim of Privilege in Criminal Cases") would have prohibited
comment upon the claim of a privilege only in criminal cases,55 not in
both criminal and civil cases as provided for in its Proposed Federal
and Uniform Rule counterparts. 56
Article VI ("Witnesses") for the most part tracked the actual
Federal Rules of Evidence. One striking exception was Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 609 ("Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of
Crime"), which followed neither the actual federal counterpart 57 nor
the existing Massachusetts statute58 on impeachment by criminal con
viction. A second striking exception was Proposed Massachusetts
Rule 611 ("Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation"),
which departed from its federal counterpart in retaining the "wide
open" or "Massachusetts Rule" regarding scope of cross-examina
tion.59 A third, but less striking, exception was Proposed Massachu
51. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 504(a)(I) & advisory committee's note, supra note 2.
Under the proposed federal rule, the defendant-spouse would have been the holder of this
privilege. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 369 (Rule 505(a». Under Fed
eral Rule 501, the witness-spouse is the holder of this privilege. Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
52. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20 (1990).
53. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 504(b), supra note 2. Thus, as a rule of disqualification
rather than privilege, a husband and wife would have been incompetent to testify as to a
confidential communication between them-oral, telephonic, or written-even if both
spouses wanted the communication revealed in court. Gallagher v. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d
53, 54 (Mass. 1988).
54. See, e.g., Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 503, supra note 2 ("Religious Privilege") (broad
ening the narrow, statutory "priest-penitent" theological base of MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233,
§ 20A (1990), to equalize adherents and clergy within many recognized religions).
55. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 512, supra note 2.
56. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 382 (Rule 513); UN IF. R. EVID.
512.
57. FED. R. EVID. 609. It should be noted that Federal Rule 609(a) was amended in
January, 1990, to more clearly allocate the burdens of parties and the task of the trial judge
in considering convictions for impeachment purposes. Amendments to Federal Rules of
Evidence-Rule 609 129 F.R.D. 347, 347-55 (1990).
58. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 21 (1990).
59. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 611(b), supra note 2. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 611(b)
provides that "[a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the
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setts Rule 612 ("Writing or Object Used to Refresh Memory"), which
purportedly maintained the substance of the federal rule while merely
changing the federal rule's format. 60
In Article VII ("Opinions and Expert Testimony"), the advisory
committee adhered to the federal rules language,61 including Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 703 ("Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts"),
which permits an expert witness to rely upon facts not admitted (and,
indeed, not admissible) into evidence in forming an expert opinion. 62
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 706 ("Court Appointed Experts") dif
fered from its federal counterpart by expressly denying the trial judge
discretion to disclose to the jury the fact that a given expert had been
appointed by the court. 63
Article VIII ("Hearsay") contained relatively few differences
from the federal rules despite the difficulty of the subject. 64 Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 801 ("Definitions") was identical to the federal
rule. 6S Proposed Massachusetts Rule 802 ("The Hearsay Rule") was
similar to the federal rule in that it recognized the possibility of hear
say exceptions outside the four corners of the rules codification. Un
fortunately, the advisory committee did not comprehensively list the
existing outside exceptions in the same manner as the federal rule. 66
Departures from the Federal Rules of Evidence did crop up in the
hearsay exceptions gathered under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803
("Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial") and
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804 ("Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant
case, including credibility. In the interests ofjustice, the judge may limit cross-examination
with respect to matters not testified to on direct examination." Id. This is the mirror
image of Federal Rule 61 I(b), which permits cross-examination on matters not testified to
on direct examination only at the discretion of the judge. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
60. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 612, supra note 2. But see the criticism of this "format".
change as affecting substantive discretion of the trial judge in BBA Brief, supra note 18, at
47.
61. It should be noted that Federal Rule 704 was amended in 1984 to split the rule
into subsections "(a)" and "(b)", and to include in Rule 704(b) a restriction against ulti
mate issue testimony in certain criminal cases having to do with mental condition, as a
response to the litigation over John Hinckley'S attempt to assassinate then-President Ron
ald Reagan in 1981. Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
2067.
62. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2; FED. R. EVID. 703. See infra text ac
companying notes 187-200 for a discussion of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703.
63. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 706, supra note 2. See the criticism of this departure from
the federal rule in BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 51-52.
64. See generally Gilda M. Tuoni, Hearsay-Its Application in Massachusetts and
Federal Courts, 73 MASS. L. REV. 100 (1988).
65. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801, supra note 2; FED. R. EVID. 801.
66. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 802, supra note 2; see FED. R. EVID. 802 advisory commit
tee's note.
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Unavailable"). For the most part, these variations were trivia1. 67
Some significant departures should be noted, however.
In Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(1) ("Present Sense Impres
sion"), the committee included language (not contained in the federal
rule) that would permit a trial judge to exclude an otherwise qualify
ing hearsay statement when such statement is made under circum
stances indicating untrustworthiness. 68 In Proposed Massachusetts
Rule 803(18) ("Learned Treatises"), the committee deleted language
(contained in the federal rule) that would have permitted the use of
learned treatises on direct examination of an expert. 69 Finally, the
committee deleted from the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evi
dence the residual or "catch-all" exception found in Federal Rule
803(24) ("Other Exceptions"). 70
The advisory committee also departed from the federal rules in
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804. In Proposed Rule 804(a) ("Defini
tion of Unavailability"), the committee deleted certain parenthetical
preconditions to eligibility for the hearsay exceptions under Proposed
Rule 804(b).71 Under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(b)(5), the
committee again deleted the sister residual exception, which is found
in the federal rule, and replaced that residual exception with language
incorporating a statutory hearsay exception for certain declarations of
a deceased person. 72
In Article IX ("Authentication and Identification") of the Pro
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence, the advisory committee
67. See, for example, the deletion of Federal Rule 803(15) ("Statements in Docu
ments Affecting an Interest in Property") on the ground that "[t]rustworthiness [of such
statements] is considered insufficient and the need for such an exception is marginal."
Although the committee deleted this exception, it reserved the slot for the rule. Prop.
Mass. R. Evid. 803(15) advisory committee's note, supra note 2 ("Reserved").
68. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 803(1), supra note 2. The advisory committee believed this
modification was justified by "[c]oncems of reliability of statements potentially admissible
under the federal formulation." Id. at Rule 803(1) advisory committee's note.
69. Id. at Rule 803(18). This deletion was strongly criticized on efficiency grounds
in the BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 58-59. See infra note 173 for a discussion of the recent
adoption of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(18) by the Supreme Judicial Court.
70. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 803(24), supra note 2 ("Reserved"). This deletion by the
committee was also strongly criticized, on consistency and judicial administration grounds,
in the BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 60-61.
71. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 804(a), supra note 2. The precondition required the propo
nent of a hearsay statement under certain hearsay exceptions in part "(b)" to depose or
otherwise obtain the past testimony of a declarant, who by the time of trial has become
unavailable. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
72. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 804(b)(5), supra note 2. Again, this deletion and substitu
tion was criticized (on consistency, judicial administration and redundancy grounds) in the
BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 63.
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tracked the corresponding federal rules closely, making internal
changes only to reflect the different governmental labels applicable to
agencies at the state level. 73 The committee did add to Proposed Mas
sachusetts Rule 902 ("Self-authentication") a subparagraph, not found
in the federal rule, for hospital and other medical records. 74 Addition
ally, the committee drafted Proposed Massachusetts Rule 903 ("Sub
scribing Witness' Testimony Unnecessary") to reflect concerns
exclusive to the state, which were more narrow than those behind the
federal counterpart. 7S The advisory committee tracked exactly the
federal rule language for all of Article X ("Contents of Writings, Re
cordings and Photographs"), which deals with the concerns of the
"Best Evidence Rule."76 Drawing from the Uniform Rules of Evi
dence, the committee, in Article XI ("Miscellaneous Rules"), pro
vided for the general applicability of the code in the courts of the
commonwealth,77 exceptions to the code's applicability in certain pro
ceedings,78 and a citable title for the code. 79
In summary, the codification submitted by the advisory commit
tee to the Supreme Judicial Court was organized substantially along
the structural lines of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with a number of
departures from specific federal provisions, many of which are contro
versial. Shortly after the proposed Massachusetts rules were submit
ted in July, 1980, the court asked a number of organizations, including
the Boston Bar Association, to comment on the proposal. 80 On June
21, 1982, the court requested briefs regarding the proposed rules,81
and numerous organizations responded. 82 The brief of the Boston Bar
Association, which included seventy pages of argument, was an at
tempt at a comprehensive treatment of the rules. 83 Though impossible
73.
74.
75.
rule. Id.
76.
77.
78.
79.
1102.
80.

Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 901-02, supra note 2.
Id. at Rule 902(11).
Id. at Rule 903. The basis for this narrower approach was Maine's version of the
at Rule 903 advisory committee's note. See ME. R. EVID. 903.
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 1001-08, supra note 2.
Id. at Rule 1100(a).
Id. at Rule 1101(b).
If adopted, the code would have been cited as "Mass. R. Evid." See id. at Rule

BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 1.
Id.
82. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, 11 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 457, 483 (1983).
83. BBA Brief, supra note 18. The contributors to the brief included two successive
chairmen of the Committee on Civil Procedure of the Boston Bar Association, Daniel B.
Bickford and Robert J. Sherer, and Civil Procedure Committee members William H.
Baker, Jean F. Farrington, F. Anthony Mooney, Stuart T. Rossman, and the author of this
Article, most of whom met weekly over the course of the fall of 1980, to the spring of 1981,
to discuss and analyze the proposed code.
81.
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to assess with precision, it was this author's impression that most of
the interested organizations believed that codification of Massachu
setts evidence law was sensible, especially if it was modeled on the
federal rules, and that the only real issue to be decided by the Supreme
Judicial Court was the authoritative version of the wording of certain
individual rules. 84 Consequently, the Boston Bar Association brief
spent only five pages extolling the virtues of a codified system of evi
dence and its remaining sixty-five pages carefully analyzing and sug
gesting improvements in the wording of individual proposed rules. 85
It came as a bit of a shock, therefore, when at oral argument on
September 9, 1982,86 a majority of the court sitting en bane appeared
to be more interested in discussing the overall issue of codification
rather than perspectives on individual proposed rules. Some advocates
realized belatedly that efforts to make the code more perfect might
result in no code at all, and at least one short article was written as a
plea to the court to adopt some codification, preferably based on the
federal rules, as the evidence law of the commonwealth. 87
Unfortunately, on December 30, 1982, the court declined codifi
cation in a short "announcement."88 After thanking all involved for
their efforts, the announcement indicated that the proposed rules
presented at least three problems: "(I) careful coordination with the
Legislature" would be required "to repeal, revise, or modify many
statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence; (2)
many of the Proposed Rules involve[d] departure[s] from the princi
ples set forth in the Federal Rules ... ; and (3) some of the Proposed
Rules [were] subject to significant and arguably valid criticisms."89
While the announcement did not specify which proposed rules in cate
gories (2) and (3) troubled the court, "a majority of the Justices"90 had
a more philosophical opposition to the Proposed Rules. Part of the
opposition stemmed from a conclusion that "promulgation of rules of
84. For instance, the Civil Procedure Committee of the Boston Bar Association was
"unanimous in favoring a codification of rules governing evidence in the courts of the
[c]ommonwealth" and supported "strongly ... basing the codification upon the actual (and
proposed) Federal Rules of Evidence ... departing from that basis only rarely." BBA
Brief, supra note 18, at 1-2.
85. Id. at 1-70. See also Paul G. Garrity & Samuel Nagler, Impeachment and Reha
bilitation of Witnesses by Evidence of Character and Past Conduct Under Proposed Massa
chusetts Rules of Evidence 608 and 609,67 MASS. L. REV. 13 (1982).
86. SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
87. Jeremiah F. Healy III, Codification of Massachusetts Evidence Law, 11 MASS.
LAW. WKLY. 153 (1982).

88.
89.
90.

SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
Id.
[d.
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evidence would tend to restrict the development of common-law prin
ciples pertaining to the admissibility of evidence."91 Another factor
was "the view of some of the Justices that the Federal Rules of Evi
dence [had] not led to uniform practice in the various Federal
courts. "92 A third reason for the opposition was the opinion that the
federal rules were, "in some instances, less well adapted to the needs of
modem trial practice than current Massachusetts law."93
Therefore, "a majority of the Justices ... concluded that it would
not be advisable to adopt the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evi
dence at the present time."94 The announcement went on to suggest
that the proposed rules had "substantial value as a comparative stan
dard in the continued and historic role of the courts in developing
principles of law relating to evidence ... [and] invited [parties] to cite
the Proposed Rules, wherever appropriate, in briefs and memoranda
submitted."95
Shortly after the announcement, a number of individuals associ
ated with the proposed rules project were interviewed. Some accepted
the decision graciously, others were surprised or disappointed. 96
Judge Fenton, the chairperson of the advisory committee indicated
that he thought "the Proposed Rules [would] still be used as a stan
dard for developing rules of evidence on a caseby case basis."97 As
the next section of this Article will demonstrate, the chairperson's
comment was at least partly prophetic.

II.

THE MASSACHUSETIS COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE
PROPOSED RULES

The Supreme Judicial Court's invitation to the bar to cite to the
proposed code was repeated in the Chief Justice's next annual report98
and in many subsequent cases. 99 However, even before the proposed
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. SJC Rejects Evidence Code, supra note 82, at 483. Advisory committee member
Richard O. Gelinas, one of those "surprised by the [c]ourt's decision," was quoted as say
ing he "was not aware of any great body of opposition to the Proposed Rules and ... really
thought they would be ... adopted." [d.
97. Id.
98. Edward F. Hennessey, The State of the Judiciary: Seventh Annual Report of the
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 68 MASS. L. REV. 3, 7 (1983).
99. See, e.g., Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 n.3 (Mass. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Trapp, 485 N.E.2d 162, 166 n.5 (Mass. 1985).
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Massachusetts rules were officially submitted to the court in July,
1980, both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts Appeals
Court began citing to them. loo Indeed, prior to the rejection of the
proposed code on December 30, 1982, the commonwealth's highest
court cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules in thirty cases, and the
commonwealth's intermediate appellate court cited to the proposed
rules in fourteen cases.101 An exhaustive review of all the cases deal·
ing with the proposed Massachusetts rules is not possible here. 102
However, an overview of the types of citations made and an analysis of
selected cases is helpful to understanding how the rules have been used
in case law.
Prior to the December, 1982, rejection of the proposed code, the
overwhelming majority of Supreme Judicial Court citations to the
Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence noted the ways in which
the rules supported existing Massachusetts law. I03 Several cases cited
to both the Proposed Massachusetts Rules and the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 104 Occasionally, within a single case, the court would cite
both to proposed rules that supported existing Massachusetts law and
to proposed rules that contrasted with such law.lOs
After the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the proposed code in
December, 1982, courts continued to cite to those proposed Massa·
chusetts rules that supported existing Massachusetts law. 106 In some
100. See. e.g., Bishop v. Klein, 402 N.E.2d 1365, 1370 (Mass. 1980) (citing Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 510 as support for existing Massachusetts law); Commonwealth v.
Greene, 404 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule
803(5) as partially supporting and partially restricting existing Massachusetts law).
101. Search of LEXIS, States library, Mass file, (Jan. 16, 1992).
102. See McNAUGHT & FLANNERY, supra note 2. for a collection of these citations.
103. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Maltais, 438 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Mass. 1982) (citing
to Proposed Massachusetts Rule 606(b) on juror competency); Commonwealth v. Booker.
436 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Mass. 1982) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 401 on relevance);
Commonwealth v. Perry. 433 N.E.2d 446, 450 n.9 (Mass. 1982) (citing Proposed Massa
chusetts Rule 403 on prejudicial effect of otherwise relevant evidence).
104. See. e.g., Shore v. Shore, 432 N.E.2d 526, 527 n.2 (Mass. 1982) (quoting Federal
Rule 411 and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 411 on exclusion of evidence on insurance);
Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 432 N.E.2d 474, 478 (Mass. 1982) (citing Federal
Rule 805 and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 805 on hearsay within hearsay).
105. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Collett, 439 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 n.4, 1232 (Mass.
1982) (noting that Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503 is contrary to existing statutory privi
lege laws, but Proposed Massachusetts Rule 1000a) supports existing common law on a
trial judge's determination of legal questions); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 434 N.E.2d
163, 169-70 & n.8 (Mass. 1982) (stating that Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(a)(5) re
garding unavailability of a hearsay declarant is consistent with existing Massachusetts law,
but Proposed Rule 804(a). in general, would expand existing Massachusetts law on
unavailability).
106. See. e.g.• Commonwealth v. Amral, 554 N.E.2d 1189. 1196 (Mass. 1990) (citing
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such situations, the court also continued to pair the proposed state
rule with the federal rule. I07 However, more diversity of citation also
began to appear. The courts began to contrast existing Massachusetts
law with proposed rule counterparts more frequently. lOS The courts
also cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules with little or no discus
sion either because the parties to the litigation had failed to argue the
code standard,l09 or because the proposed rule was not applicable to
the facts of the current case. 11O The courts even occasionally used the
rules arguendo. III
Without question, however, the Supreme Judicial Court's most
important citations to the proposed code have been the surprisingly
few situations in which the court has either adopted or rejected indi
vidual provisions of proposed rules as the common law of the com
monwealth. Accordingly, a closer examination of these cases is
appropriate.
The first case in which the Supreme Judicial Court appeared to
embrace an aspect of the proposed code was Commonwealth v.
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 509(c)(3) on the privilege regarding an informer's identity);
McNamara v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139,146 n.1O (Mass. 1989) (citing Proposed Massa
chusetts Rule 803(7) on absence of business record); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 537
N.E.2d 146, 148 (Mass. 1989) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 90l(b)(5)-(6) on au
thentication of voice); Commonwealth v. Comtois, 506 N.E.2d 503, 508 (Mass. 1987) (cit
ing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(4) on statement for medical diagnosis or treatment).
107. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 557 N.E.2d 1380, 1382 (Mass. 1990)
(pairing Federal Rule 401 with Proposed Massachusetts Rule 401 on relevancy); Common
wealth v. Fuller, 506 N.E.2d 852, 855 n.9 (Mass. 1987) (pairing Federal Rule 803(2) with
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(2) on excited utterances); Commonwealth v. Gil, 471
N.E.2d 30, 40 (Mass. 1984) (pairing Federal Rule 805 with Proposed Massachusetts Rule
805 on hearsay within hearsay).
108. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dockham, 542 N.E.2d 591,599 (Mass. 1989) (cit
ing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 405(a) on methods of proving character); Jacobs v. Town
Clerk, 525 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Mass. 1988) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 301(a) on
effect of presumption); Commonwealth v. Monico, 488 N.E.2d 1168, 1175 n.9 (Mass. 1986)
(citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 701 on lay opinion evidence); Three Juveniles v.
Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 n.3 (Mass. 1983) (citing Proposed Massachusetts
Rule 501 on privileges), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
109. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hartman, 534 N.E.2d 1170, 1175 n.9 (Mass. 1989)
'. (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 201 on judicial notice).
110. See, e.g., Sacco V. Roupenian, 564 N.E.2d 386, 388 n.3 (Mass. 1990) (citing
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703 on the bases of expert testimony); Department of Reve
nue v. Sorrentino, 557 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts
Rule 801(d)(I)(B) on adoptive admissions and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(16) on
ancient documents).
111. See, e.g., District Attorney V. Board of Selectmen, 481 N.E.2d 1128, 1130 n.4
(Mass. 1985) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 501(a)(I) on the attorney-client privi
lege of a public client); Commonwealth V. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1028 n.7 (Mass.),
cerro denied, 474 U.S. 906 (1985) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 512).
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Weichell,l12 which was argued to the court en banc 113 prior to the
December, 1982, rejection of the proposed rules, but decided after that
rejection had been announced.1I4 In Weichell, the defendant asked
the court to reverse his conviction for first degree murder on a number
of grounds, including the admission against him of a photostatic copy
of an "Identikit" composite created by a police officer with the help of
an eyewitness. llS Massachusetts common law, as it existed at that
time, dictated that the court exclude composites when offered as sub
stantive evidence of identification of the defendant as the cUlprit. 116 In
an intervening case, Commonwealth v. Blaney,1I7 the court did not
reach the issue of the admissibility of an "Identikit" composite be
cause it determined that the composite drawing in Blaney could not
have been prejudicial to the defendant. lIs The composite in Weichell
was offered at trial only for corroboration of the witness' in-court iden
tification of the defendant,1I9 a use the court had previously held not
to be hearsay on the ground that evidence of corroboration is not of
fered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the corroborating
statement. 120 Despite those earlier holdings, the court in Weichell
stated that a composite, though perhaps not even a "statement" under
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(a),121 is clearly within the
801(d)(1)(C)122 exception to the definition of "hearsay" and therefore
112. 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984).
113. Since the defendant had been convicted in the Massachusetts Superior Court of
murder in the first degree, his appeal went directly to the Supreme Judicial Court rather
than the Massachusetts Appeals Court. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 278, § 33E (1990).
114. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d at 1038.
115. Id. at 1042. Justice Liacos described in some detail the process of "composing"
a composite. Id. at 1049 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
116. Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560, 567 (Mass. 1969).
117. 442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982).
118. Id. at 393. The Massachusetts Appeals Court decision in Blaney did discuss the
hearsay issue of admissibility of the composite, citing by a "cf." signal to Proposed Massa
chusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(C) in the course of deciding that the composite was not inadmissi
ble hearsay. Commonwealth v. Blaney, 428 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd,
442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982). See Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(I)(C), supra note 2.
119. Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 (Mass. 1983) (en banc),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984).
120. Id. (citing prior cases).
121. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(a) provides as follows: "Definitions-The
following definitions apply under this article: (a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral
or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(a), supra note 2.
122. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(C) provides as follows: "(d) State
ments which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-(I) Prior statement by wit
ness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (C) one of identification of a person after
perceiving him." Id. at Rule 801(d)(I)(C).
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is admissible on the issue of identity for substantive purposes, and not
merely for corroboration. 123 However, despite this analysis, the ma
jority ultimately "concluded" that an "Identikit" composite is admis
sible as substantive evidence on identity without citing to Proposed
Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as authority.124
Justice Liacos filed a vigorous dissent,125 in which he argued that
the risk of prejudice to the defendant was high because the eyewitness'
opportunity to observe the perpetrator was slight and because the
prosecutor emphasized the composite in closing argument. 126 In the
dissent's view, the reliability of a composite is too questionable and its
status as hearsay too clear, especially given the court's abandonment
in earlier cases of any distinction between fully "substantive" and
merely "corroborative" evidence on identification.127 However, Jus
tice Liacos discussed the proposed Massachusetts rule only in a foot
note and then only by way of paraphrasing the non-hearsay effect of
the rule itself. 128
The next case to discuss an aspect of the proposed Massachusetts
rules cast some doubt on the court's intention in Weichell. In Com
monwealth v. Daye, 129 the court attempted to resolve several difficult
issues involving out-of-court statements on the identification issue. At
the trial level, two eyewitnesses to a shooting could not, or would not,
identify the defendant in the courtroom as the perpetrator. l3O On the
stand, Witness A denied having made a prior identification of the de
fendant from a photographic array.l3l Witness B recalled having se
lected a few photos from the array that Witness B thought showed the
perpetrator. 132 The prosecutor subsequently called to the stand a po
lice officer who testified that both Witnesses A and B had positively
123. Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Mass. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1032 (1984). The court did indicate, however, that while the composite was ad
missible substantively, if it were standing alone as the only evidence of identification, it
might not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. Id. at 1044 n.8.
124. Id. at 1045. Presumably, the majority used the word "concJude[d]" because its
ruling on substantive admissibility was technically not a "holding," since the composite
had been entered into evidence at the trial level with an instruction limiting its effect to
corroboration. Id. at 1043.
125. Id. at 1048 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1048-49 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1052 (Liacos, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1051 n.5 (Liacos, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also dissented in
Weichell, referring to his dissenting opinion in Blaney. Id. at 1053 (citing Commonwealth
v. Blaney, 442 N.E.2d 389, 397-99 (Mass. 1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting».
129. 469 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984).
130. Id. at 486.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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identified a photo of the defendant from the array as the gunman at
the scene. 133 The trial judge instructed the jury that the officer's testi
mony could be used as evidence of defendant's guilt. 134
When the defendant appealed this aspect of the case, the Massa
chusetts Appeals Court reversed.135 That court believed that the of
ficer's testimony regarding Witness A was improperly admitted
because Witness A had explicitly disclaimed making the prior photo
graphic identification, and thus the defendant's opportunity to cross
examine Witness A at trial would not afford the defendant a genuine
opportunity to test the officer's testimony regarding Witness A's al
leged earlier photographic identification.136 By contrast, the Massa
chusetts Appeals Court upheld the admissibility of the officer's
testimony regarding Witness B on the ground that Witness B had ad
mitted on the stand that he had made a prior identification from the
array. 137
At first, the Massachusetts Appeals Court decision seems odd in
light of Weichell. If the Supreme Iudicial Court had intended to adopt
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) in Weichell, then testi
mony from the officer regarding the prior identifications by both wit
nesses should have been admissible in Daye on the face of the rule. 138
The opinion in Weichell was rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court
after Daye was argued at the Massachusetts Appeals Court level, but
before it was decided. 139 However, the Massachusetts Appeals Court
decision in Daye cited to Weichell only briefly,14O to Federal Rule
801(d)(1)(C) only in passing,141 and to Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(1)(C) not at all.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted further review in the Daye
case. 142 After discussing several of its common-law precedents in the
area of identification,143 the majority elaborated upon its decision in
Weichell. The court believed that it correctly decided in Weichell that
133. Id. at 487.
134. Id.
135. Commonwealth v. Daye, 454 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 469
N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984).
136. Id. at 504.
137. Id. at 505-06.
138. See supra note 122.
139. Compare Commonwealth v. Daye, 454 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983),
rev'd, 469 N.E.2d 483 (Mass. 1984) with Commonwealth v. WeicheU, 453 N.E.2d 1038
(Mass. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984).
140. Daye, 454 N.E.2d at 505.
141. Id. at 506.
142. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 485.
143. Id. at 487-88.
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testimony by a nonidentifying witness (such as the police officer in
Daye) concerning an extrajudicial identification by another witness
could be admitted as substantive evidence of identification and not
merely as corroboration of the identifying witness's testimony. 144 The
court also reaffirmed the probative worth of prior identifications be
cause, by definition, they are made closer in time to the litigated inci
dent than are identifications at trial. 145 However, the court disaffirmed
the probative value of a nonidentifying witness testifying to an alleged
prior identification of an "identifying" witness when the latter denies
ever having made the prior identification. 146 Accordingly, the major
ity implied that it did not adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(l)(C) in Weichell and stated that it agreed with authorities that
have construed Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(C) as prohibiting such no
nidentifying witness testimony where the "identifying" witness denies
the prior identification.147 The majority in Daye therefore concluded
that the officer's testimony regarding Witness A's prior identification
should not have been admitted. 148 The majority also concluded that
the officer's testimony regarding Witness B's prior identification
should not have been admitted, apparently because the prosecution
failed to have Witness B identify at trial the photo that Witness B had
selected from the array.149
144.

Id. at 487 n.8.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id. at 488 n.9.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 489. Analysis of Daye for the purposes of this Article is complicated by
the other major identification issue dealt with in the case: the admissibility of certain grand
jury testimony. Id. at 489-90. At trial, after Witness A denied making the photographic
array, the prosecutor asked him whether he had identified the defendant as the perpetrator
before the grand jury. Id. at 489. The prosecutor was then permitted to have the witness
read from the transcript of his grand jury testimony. Id. Witness A thereafter recanted his
grand jury identification testimony, saying he had "exaggerated" and "told things that
weren't true" in that testimony. Id. at 489 n.lO. At trial, the prosecutor argued success
fully that such grand jury testimony fit under the hearsay exception for past recollection
recorded and thus was admissible substantively on the issue of identification of the defend
ant as the perpetrator. Id. at 490. On appeal, the prosecutor argued instead that the grand
jury testimony should have been admitted because the Supreme Judicial Court should
adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A). Id. at 483. The text of Proposed Mas
sachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) provided as follows:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
(I) Prior Statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to the pen
alty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(I)(A), supra note 2.
The Supreme Judicial Court quickly dismissed the viability of the prosecution's reli
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
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Since the court in Daye believed a new tria1 was necessary, ISO it
explored the prosecution's request regarding the proposed rule, again
expressly recognizing the va1ue of the proposed code "as a compara
tive standard for the common-law evolution of our evidentiary
law."lsl After reviewing common-law precedents holding the "ortho
dox" view that prior inconsistent statements are hearsay when offered
substantively,IS2 the court justified that view on the ground that the
jury generally would be asked to credit a statement made without the
declarant having been under oath, subject to cross-examination, or
even in the presence of the jury when the statement was made. IS3
However, after reviewing more "modem" views,ls4 the majority ex
pressed a preference for the "moderate modem" view reflected in Pro
posed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A) that probative value and
substantive use should be accorded on1y to "those prior inconsistent
statements given under oath in instances where a record of the state
ment is likely to be available."lss The majority felt that even though
Witness A in the Daye case recanted his earlier grand jury testimony
on the stand, the fact that Witness A admitted making the grand jury
statements provided the defendant with sufficient capacity to effec
tively cross-examine Witness A on his prior inconsistent statement. IS6
After conducting a "head count" of the states,IS7 most of which
permit the substantive use of grand jury testimony under one "mod
em" theory or another, the majority in Daye seemed about to adopt
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in toto. However, the
court expressly declined to do so, saying that it deferred to "the incre
mental process of common-law development" to determine the admis
sibility of other forms of prior inconsistent statements, arguably
permitted under Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C), but not
ance upon past recollection recorded, as the witness/declarant denied that the statement
before the grand jury was true when it was made. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 490. The prosecu
tion briefed the issue of substantive use of prior inconsistent statements in its brief to the
Massachusetts Appeals Court, but that court did not discuss this issue in its opinion. Id. at
490 n.12. Even though this argument was never raised by the Commonwealth at trial, the
Supreme Judicial Court nevertheless permitted the prosecution to argue prior inconsistent
statement admissibility on appeal. Id.
150. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 490.
151. Id. at 491 (citing Commonwealth v. Weichell, 453 N.E.2d 1038 (Mass. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1032 (1984».
152. Id. at 490-91.
153. Id. at 491 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 251, at 601 (2d ed. 1972».
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 491-92.
157. Id. at 493 n.14.
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presented by the record in the Daye case itself. ISS The majority also
imposed two express conditions to admissibility: a requirement that
the witness/declarant at trial have a recollection of the events to which
the statement relates and a requirement that the prior statement have
been "that of the witness, rather than that of the interrogator" asking
fact-filled, yes-or-no questions. 159 The court thus permitted the sub
stantive use at trial of a witness' prior inconsistent statements before a
grand jury for the reasons behind Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(1)(A), 160 without adopting the rule itself.161
Justice Liacos, while concurring in the need for a new trial, again
dissented vigorously to the court's exploration of another proposed
rule of evidence. 162 His concerns centered on unanswered state con
stitutional questions regarding confrontation rights of the defend
ant,163 the questionable value of later grand jury statements as
probative of the events being litigated,l64 and the chance that permit
ting prior inconsistent statements made before the grand jury would
also permit the police officer's testimony of Witnesses A and B's prior
identification, despite the majority's purported avoidance of this
possibility. 165
Some of Justice Liacos' concerns about the expansive use of state
ments from grand jury testimony were borne out in a later case dis
cussing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Commonwealth v.
Berrio. 166 In Berrio, the prosecution alleged that the defendant/father
158. Id. at 493. In an earlier note in the Daye case, the majority opinion referred to
several other categories of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) statements, such as
depositions in civil cases and testimony from probable cause hearings or prior trials. Id. at
485 n.2.
159. Id. at 495. The court in Daye, consistent with its decision in Weichell, also
stated that prior inconsistent grand jury testimony, while admissible substantively, would
not be sufficient standing alone to support a conviction. Id. For a discussion of Weichell
see supra note 122.
160. Id. at 492. These are mainly concerns about intimidation of witnesses resulting
in trial testimony unhelpful to the prosecution. There was apparently a significant possibil
ity of witness intimidation in the Daye trial. See id. at 486 n.6.
161. Id. at 495-96. The court also indicated that its limitations on the use of prior
inconsistent statements could not be avoided by resorting to Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(I)(C) on prior identifications, even though that rule "is consistent with our cases
governing probative use of extrajudicial identifications." Id. at 488 n.9.
162. Id. at 496 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Liacos
was joined by Justice O'Connor, who also dissented in Weichell. See supra note 128.
163. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 496 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The majority dismissed federal constitutional concerns on the authority of California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 492.
164. Daye, 469 N.E.2d at 497 (Liacos, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. See supra note 161.
166. 551 N.E.2d 496 (Mass. 1990).
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had sexually abused his daughter, allegations that the daughter denied
at trial. 167 When the daughter testified that she had lied to the grand
jury because she was angry with her father, the trial judge permitted
the prosecutor to offer grand jury statements by the daughter to sub
stantively prove that the abuse had occurred. 168 The defendant in
Be"io argued that the Daye case was limited to substantive use of
grand jury testimony for the issue of identification only.169 After
transferring the case from the Massachusetts Appeals Court, the
Supreme Judicial Court held that in Daye, "we simply adopted Pro
posed Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) subject to conditions declared by
us. Neither the rule nor Daye is limited to identification evidence."17o
The court went on to reject the defendant's argument that the Daye
conditions had not been satisfied in his case.l7l Chief Justice Liacos
again dissented vigorously on the grounds he raised in his opinion in
Daye. l72
The one case to date in which the Supreme Judicial Court whole
heartedly, if not unanimously, adopted provisions of the proposed
Massachusetts code is Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Public Safety.173 In
Ruszcyk, the plaintiff was a municipal police officer in training who
was injured while going through a doorway at the Massachusetts State
Police Academy.174 At trial, the plaintiff offered to prove that the
commandant of the academy, a week after the incident, told two mu
nicipal officials that a state trooper at the academy had "kicked in the
door on the plaintiff."17S The trial judge excluded the statement on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to offer sufficient evidence that the
commandant had been authorized to make statements admitting to
liability on behalf of the Commonwealth. 176
After transferring the case on its own initiative from the Massa
chusetts Appeals Court,177 the Supreme Judicial Court held that there
Id. at 500.
Id. at 500-01.
Id. at 501.
Id.
Id.
172. Id. at 501-02 (Liacos, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
173. 517 N.E.2d 152 (Mass. 1988). Shortly before this Article went to press, the
Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Sneed, 597 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1992).
In Sneed, the court decided to adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(18) on the admissi
bility of learned treatises. Id. at 1351. The proposed rule is similar, but not identical, to
Federal Rule 803(18). Id. at 1350 n.6.
174. Ruszcyk, 517 N.E.2d at 153.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

24

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 15:1

was insufficient evidence of actual authority in the commandant under
common-law precedents in Massachusetts. 178 However, the majority
decided to accept the plaintiff's suggestion, made also to the trial
judge,179 that the court adopt Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(2)(O), the so-called "scope of employment" vicarious party ad
mission exception to the hearsay definition.180 In doing so, the court
also refused to read into the proposed Massachusetts rule a require
ment that the employee/declarant have personal knowledge of the
event described in his or her statement. 181 While such a refusal is con
sistent with federal interpretations of the parallel federal rule,182 the
court did suggest that personal knowledge, as well as other considera
tions,183 should be considered by a state court trial judge in making a
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403 184 determination of whether the
probative value of the statement is substantially outweighed by any
prejudicial effect it causes the opponent of the evidence. 18s Thus, the
Supreme Judicial Court in Ruszcyk adopted two proposed rules by
combining them. Justice O'Connor in his dissent, maintained that
even if Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(1)(C) ought to be
adopted, the facts of this case were insufficient to establish that the
commandant's statement was within the scope of the commandant's
employment. 186
The one case to date in which the court has discussed, but de
clined to adopt a proposed rule, is Department of Youth Services v. A
178. [d. at 154.
179. [d.
180. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(O) provides as follows: "(d) State
ments which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if- ... (2) Admission by party
opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (0) a statement by his agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during
the existence of the relationship." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), supra note 2.
181. Ruszcyk, 517 N.E.2d at 154.
182. [d.
183. These other factors include credibility of the witness, the proponent's need for
the particular piece of evidence, and the reliability of the evidence, all of which the trial
judge should consider outside the hearing of the jury as provided in Proposed Massachu- .
setts Rule 1000c). [d. at 155.
184. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403 provides as follows:
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFU
SION, OR WASTE OF TIME-Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 403, supra note 2.
185. Ruszcyk, 517 N.E.2d at ISS.
186. [d. at 156-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Juvenile. 187 In A Juvenile, the Supreme Judicial Court, again after
taking the case on direct appellate review,188 was asked by the Com
monwealth to enlarge the bases for admission of expert opinion by
adopting Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703. 189 At trial, a psychiatrist
had testified against the juvenile defendant, basing his opinion that the
juvenile presented "a very significant danger [to] the physical well
being of the community"l90 on a number of internal department re
ports that he had reviewed, but that were never offered into evi
dence. 191 Under Massachusetts common law, such an opinion must be
based on some combination of the witness' own personal knowledge,
admitted facts, or the testimony of other witnesses given or to be given
at trial. 192 Under the second sentence of Proposed Massachusetts
Rule 703, the psychiatrist's review of the records would be a sufficient
basis for his opinion provided such records were "reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or infer
ences upon the subject."193 After noting the justification for the paral
lel federal rule,194 the court expressed its concern over the "serious
potential for abuse,"19s especially the possibility that a litigant would
seek an expert who would use inadmissible evidence as the basis for his
or her opinion in order to allow the jury to hear that inadmissible
evidence. 196 Because of these concerns, the court decided not to ac
cept the principles of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703. 197 Instead,
187. 499 N.E.2d 812 (Mass. 1986). But see Margaret E. Foley, Comment, Evi
dence-Supreme Judicial Court Partially Adopts Proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence
703, Department of Youth Serv. v. A Juvenile, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 954 (1987).
188. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 813.
189. Id. at 819. The text of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 703 is as follows:
BASES OF OPINION TEsTIMONY BY EXPERTS--The facts or data in the particular
case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived
by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2.
190. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 815.
191. Id. at 818.
192. Id.
193.. Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 703, supra note 2.
194. Basically, the court said that judges should accept in the courtroom what an
expert, such as a doctor, would rely upon in making "life-and-death" decisions in a hospi
tal. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 819 (quoting extensively from FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory
committee's note, 28 U.S.C. app. 711 (1982)).
195. Id. at 820 (quoting from David A. Schlueter, Emerging Problems Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LmG. 204,210).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 821. See Annotation, Admissibility of Testimony of Expert, as to Basis of

26

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

the court took "a modest step"198 and struck a compromise between
the common law and the proposed rule, stating that if the facts or data
upon which the expert bases his or her opinion are admissible into
evidence, and are of the sort that experts in that specialty reasonably
rely upon in forming their real world opinions, then the expert may
state the opinion without the facts or data actually being admitted into
evidence. 199 The purpose of this compromise was to reduce the unnec
essary introduction of admissible evidence that would serve no pur
pose beyond being the basis for the expert's opinion. 2OO
Unfortunately, the Supreme Judicial Court's tendency to cite to
the proposed rules frequently, but explore them rarely, affiicts the
Massachusetts Appeals Court as well. While many opinions of the
commonwealth's intermediate court of appellate jurisdiction have
cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules, 20 1 few are noteworthy.
Most of the appellate court's decisions citing the proposed rules did so
to illustrate that a common law decision of the Supreme Judicial
Court was in accord with a proposed rule. 202 To some extent, this
tendency is understandable: the Massachusetts Appeals Court, as an
intermediate appellate court, is presumably charged with correcting
errors based on existing law rather than creating new law. Also, in a
number of the cases in which the Supreme Judicial Court discussed
the adoption of a proposed Massachusetts rule, that court took the
relevant case from the Massachusetts Appeals Court203 before the lat
ter court had an opportunity to express its opinion. However, in some
cases the Massachusetts Appeals Court did anticipate the Supreme Ju
dicial Court's later action. 204 The Massachusetts Appeals Court also
His Opinion. in Matters Otherwise Excludible as Hearsay-State Cases, 89 A.L.R. 4TH 456
(1991).
198. A Juvenile, 499 N.E.2d at 821.
199. Id.
200. Id. While somewhat cryptic, there is also a passage in A Juvenile that indicates
that the court would be inclined to follow most of Proposed Massachusetts Rule 705 on
order of proof for the examination of an expert. See id.; Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 705, supra
note 2. See also Commonwealth v. Daye, 587 N.E.2d 194 (Mass. 1992).
201. A total of 54 Massachusetts Appeals Court cases citing to one or more of the
proposed rules was found by a search of LEXIS, States library, Mass file (Jan. 16, 1992).
202. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 568 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Mass. App. Ct.
1991) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 804(b)(3) on statements against interest);
Genova v. Genova, 554 N.E.2d 1221, 1224 (Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 557 N.E.2d
1385 (Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 105 on limited admissibility); In re
Adoption of George, 537 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (citing Proposed Mas
sachusetts Rule 803(8) on statements in public records).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 166-200 (discussing Berrio, Ruszcyk, and A
Juvenile).
204. Commonwealth v. Blaney, 428 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), rev'd,
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upon occasion has turned to the proposed Massachusetts rules to af
firm a trial judge's rejection of evidence expansion,20s to decide an is
sue involving two conflicting lines of common-law precedent,206 and to
contrast a current statute with the same concept under a proposed
rule. 207
The proposed Massachusetts rules have fared even worse in the
Massachusetts federal courts. Of course, federal trial courts every
where are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in most proceed
ingS. 208 While several individual federal rules direct the federal trial
judge to look to state evidence law when state substantive law provides
the controlling rule of decision on the merits,209 historically few fed
eral cases have cited to the proposed Massachusetts rules as gui
dance. 2 \o Two of these cases are worthy of discussion. In the first,
Command Transportation, Inc. v. Y.s. Line Corp. ,211 the issue was
whether a former employee of a corporation could be considered "a
442 N.E.2d 389 (Mass. 1982). In Blaney, the court raised the issue of the application of
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(l)(C) to "Identikit" composites, the centerpiece of
the Weichell case. See supra text accompanying notes 112-28.
205. Simmons v. Yurchak, 551 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 554
N.E.2d 851 (Mass. 1990). In Simmons, the court affirmed the trial judge's exclusion of
evidence beyond expressions of pain by discussing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 803(3) (on
statements of present mental or physical condition), and Proposed Massachusetts Rule 403
(on balancing probative value against the danger of misleading the jury), and the absence of
a residuary hearsay rule exception in the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Id. at
542. But see, FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
206. Neitlich v. Peterson, 447 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983). In Neitlich, the
court used Proposed Massachusetts Rule 510 (on waiver of privilege) as guidance in choos
ing between a broader and a narrower view of the scope of a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Id. at 673-74.
207. Commonwealth v. Clemons, 427 N.E.2d 761 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). In Clem
ons, the court compared the definition of "psychotherapist" in the statutory patient-psy
chotherapist privilege in chapter 233, § 20B of the Massachusetts General Laws with
similar but broader terms in Proposed Massachusetts Rule 503. Id. at 764 n.3. Compare
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20B (1990) (amended 1977 Mass. Acts 817) with Prop. Mass. R.
Evid. 503, supra note 2.
208. FED. R. EVID. 101; FED. R. EVID. 1101.
209. See. e.g., FED. R. EVID. 302 ("Presumptions"); FED. R. EVID. 501 ("Privi
leges"); FED. R. EVID. 601 ("Competency of Witness").
210. Only four such cases could be found through a search of LEXIS, Genfed li
brary, Dist file (Jan. 17, 1992). See. e.g., Siguel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 52 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697 (D. Mass. 1990) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
on scope of employment admission); Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line Corp., 116
F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 502(a)(2) on definition of
representative of client for attorney-client privilege); N.O. v. Callahan, 110 F.R.D. 637 (D.
Mass. 1986) (citing Proposed Massachusetts Rule 508 on governmental privilege); Thomas
v. Frederick, No. 83-3271-MA, slip op. (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 1984) (citing Proposed Massa
chusetts Rule 609 on impeachment by criminal conviction).
211. 116 F.R.D. 94 (D. Mass. 1987).
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representative of the client" within the corporation's attorney-client
privilege. 212 Since the issue arose in a diversity case, Magistrate Alex
ander determined that the Massachusetts law of attorney-client privi
lege would apply.213 However, she had difficulty finding any guidance
under the Supreme Judicial Court's case law. 214 Proposed Massachu
setts Rule 502(a)(2)2IS contained the restrictive "control-group" test
but this choice had been controversial at the advisory committee level
and, moreover, was growing "old" as a standard and had not been
embraced by the Supreme Judicial Court. 216 Magistrate Alexander
turned to a Massachusetts case217 that cited the Supreme Court's deci
sion in Upjohn Co. v. United States 218 with approval, even though
Upjohn involved the privilege status of a current, rather than former,
employee of the corporate client. 219
In the second noteworthy federal case citing a proposed Massa
chusetts rule, Sigue/ v. Trustees of Tufts College, 220 Judge Young was
required to apply certain provisions from the Massachusetts Bar Asso
ciation's standards of professional responsibility.221 In trying to deter
mine whether the relevant disciplinary rule222 prohibited one party
from interviewing former and current employees of a corporate oppo
nent without the presence or prior approval of corporate counsel,223
the judge looked at a 1982 decision of the Committee on Professional
Ethics of the Massachusetts Bar Association. 224 However, Judge
Young's analysis of that 1982 decision, which would prohibit such pri
212. [d. at 95.
213. [d.
214. rd.
215. Proposed Massachusetts Rule 502(a)(2) provides as follows: "LAWYER-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE-(a) Definitions. As used in this rule ... (2) A 'representative of the client' is
one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered
pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client." Prop. Mass. R. Evid. 502(a)(2), supra note 2.
216. Command Transp., Inc. v. Y.S. Line Corp., 116 F.R.D. 94, 97 n.1O (D. Mass.
1987). See supra text accompanying notes 41-45 for a discussion of Proposed Massachu
setts Rule 502(a)(2).
217. Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Mass.), cert. denied,474
U.S. 906 (1985).
218. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
219. Command, 116 F.R.D. at 96-97.
220. 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 697 (0. Mass. 1990).
221. Local District Court Rule 5(d)(4)(B) of the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts adopts the provisions of Rule 3:07 of the Rules of the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court as the code of professional responsibility for members of the
local federal district court bar. D. MASS. CT. R. 5(d)(4)(B).
222. MASS. S.J.C. R. 3:07, DR 7-104(A)(I).
223. Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698.
224. [d.
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vate interviews,225 led him to believe that the decision turned on the
fact that the ethics committee had believed that Massachusetts law on
the scope of employment exception to the hearsay concept was about
to be changed to conform with Proposed Massachusetts Rule
801(d)(2)(D), permitting unauthorized employee admissions to be ad
mitted against the corporate employer.226 Judge Young concluded
that "[s]ince events have proved otherwise, there may be some occa
sion to reconsider" the ethics committee decision. 227
What is the problem with Judge Young's analysis? The problem
is that while the Supreme Judicial Court declined to adopt the Pro
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence in toto, the court did adopt
expressly Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(2)(D) as part of the
commonwealth's evidence law in the Ruszcyk 228 case in January,
1988, more than two years before the Sigue/ 229 case was considered.
The majority justices of the Supreme Judicial Court in Weichell
and Daye may believe that these cases from the state and federal
courts in Massachusetts demonstrate the "value [of the proposed Mas
sachusetts rules] as a comparative standard for the common-law
evolution of our evidentiary law."23o The dissenters in those cases
probably disagree. However, when one explores the foregoing in de
tail, it is apparent that ten years of use of the proposed Massachusetts
rules as a comparative standard has not particularly advanced the law
of evidence in the commonwealth. Most of the citations to the pro
posed rules have been makeweight, superfluous allusions to situations
in which the proposed codified rule and actual common-law rule
would have the same effect. Most of the remaining citations are
acknowledgements of contrast between the rules, without helpful dis
cussion, and many judges could have cited to the parallel federal rule
as a "comparative standard." Except for Ruszcyk,231 those situations
in which the Supreme Judicial Court actually did consider adopting a
proposed Massachusetts rule resulted in either a rejection of the indi
vidual rule232 or a grudging acceptance of the rationale behind the
rule, heavily hedged with judicial conditions not found in the wording
225. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Corom. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 82-7, reprinted in 67 MASS. L. REv. 208 (1982).
226. Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 698 n.1.
227. Id.
228. Ruszcyk v. Secretary of Pub. Safety, 517 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Mass. 1988).
229. See Siguel, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 697.
230. Commonwealth v. Daye, 469 N.E.2d 483, 491 (Mass. 1984).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 173-86.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 187-200 for a discussion of A Juvenile.
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of the proposed rule itself.233 The reticence of the Massachusetts Ap
peals Court to actually use the proposed rules to improve the com
monwealth's evidence standards and the difficulty of the federal courts
ascertaining evolving evidence law of the commonwealth, suggests
that the Supreme Judicial Court's use of the proposed code does not
provide much help to those with evidence questions. As the next sec
tion of this Article demonstrates, the experience in other jurisdictions
since the rejection of the proposed Massachusetts rules ten years ago
makes even stronger the case for current codification of Massachusetts
evidence law.

III.

CODIFICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

There are numerous law review articles on the codification of evi
dence law, both at the federal and state levels. 234 Two of these articles
were written on codifications in Arkansas 23s and Maine236 by the orig
inal reporter of the proposed Massachusetts rules. 237 Given this body
of literature, a brief summary of the history of codification might be
helpful.238
There were several attempts to codify evidence in the nineteenth
century, with Oregon and California accepting a codification but New
York rejecting one. 239 In the 1920's, the Commonwealth Fund sug
233. See supra text accompanying notes 129-65 for a discussion of Daye.
234. See. e.g., Robert Banks, Jr., Some Comparisons Between the New Tennessee
Rules ofEvidence and the Federal Rules ofEvidence-Part I, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 283
(1990); Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Defining and Refining the
Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 255 (1984); Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., State
Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 293 (1990);
Michael W. Patrick, Toward a Codification of the Law of Evidence in North Carolina, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (1980); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Federal Rules of Evidence
and the Quality of Practice in Federal Courts, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 173 (1978); John R.
Schmertz, Jr., The First Decade Under Article VI of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Some
Suggested Amendments to Fill Gaps and Cure Confusion, 30 VILL. L. REv. 1367 (1985);
Grady F. Tollison, Jr., A Plea for Adoption ofthe Proposed Mississippi Rules ofEvidence, 53
MISS. L.J. 49 (1983); Leo H. Whinery, The Oklahoma Evidence Code: Ten Years ofJudi
cial Review, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 193 (1990); L. Kinvin Wroth, The Federal Rules of Evi
dence in the States: A Ten-Year Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315 (1985); Irving Younger,
Introduction to Symposium: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 251
(1984).
235. Richard H. Field, A Code ofEVidencefor Arkansas?, 29 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1975).
236. Richard H. Field, The Maine Rules ofEvidence: What They Are and How They
Got That Way, 27 ME. L. REV. 203 (1975).
237. See supra text accompanying note 11.
238. For a more detailed treatment of this history, see Saltzburg, supra note 234, at
175-83. For a more cynical treatment of the same, see Graham, supra note 234, at 298-99.
239. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 177.
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gested some modest, code-oriented reforms,24O but the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), though at first interested in a restatement of evi
dence, decided that the nationwide "law" of evidence was so defective
and conflicting that a thorough revision would be more appropriate. 241
The culmination of this effort was the Model Code of Evidence, pub
lished by the ALI in 1942.242 Despite the significant efforts of judges
and scholars, including Professor Edmund M. Morgan as Reporter
and Dean John Henry Wigmore as Chief Consultant, the Model Code
of Evidence was never enacted in any jurisdiction. 243 The code was
criticized heavily, often on the ground that it provided too much dis
cretion to the trial judge. 244
The next major effort at codification enjoyed slightly more suc
cess. Using the model code as a basis, in 1950 the National Confer
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began drafting 245 the
code that would be published as the Uniform Rules of Evidence in
1953. 246 However, only the states of California, Kansas, New Jersey
and Utah adopted the Uniform Rules,247 with both California and
New Jersey making substantial changes248 even though the Uniform
Rules made an effort to avoid the perceived pitfalls of the predecessor
model code. 249
Though not widely embraced, the Uniform Rules of 1953 did
form the basis of the effort that would culminate in the Federal Rules
240. Id. at 177-78.
241. MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE viii (Am. Law Inst. 1942), discussed in Patrick,
supra note 234, at 671 n.8.
242. MODEL CoDE OF EVIDENCE (Am. Law Inst. 1942).
243. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 178; Tollison, supra note 234, at 54. Dean
Wigmore eventually dissented from the final report on the Model Code. See John Henry
Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code ofEvidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J. 23
(1942).
244. See Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 179. For example, Massachusetts criticized
the model code on this ground, as did Ca1ifornia, which already had a code of evidence.
See RICHARD O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN ApPROACH TO EVI
DENCE 1191 (2d ed. 1982); Report of Massachusetts Bar Association on Proposed Code of
Evidence of American Law Institute, 27 MASS. L.Q. 28, Apr. 1942, at I, 28.
245. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 180.
246. UNIF. R. EVID. (1953), reprinted in JAMES F. BAILEY III & OsCAR M.
TRELLES II, 1 THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RE
LATED DOCUMENTS 161-216 (1980).
247. UNIF. R. EVID. 13 commissioners' prefatory note, 13A U.L.A. 214 (1980); Pat
rick, supra note 234, at 671 n.l7. For greater detail on the state enactments, see Wroth,
supra note 234, at 1317 n.6. The Panama Canal Zone and the Virgin Islands also adopted
the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 54 n.28.
248. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 244, at 1193. See also Spencer A. Gard,
Kansas Law and the New Uniform Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REV. 333 (1954).
249. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 244, at 1193-94.
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of Evidence. 25o Following a preliminary feasibility study on federal
court codification, requested in 1961 by the Judicial Conference of the
United States,251 a final report favorable to codification resulted in
Chief Justice Earl Warren appointing an advisory committee in 1965
to draft actual rules. 252 Preliminary drafts of the proposed federal
rules were published widely in 1969 and 1971,253 but after the final
report was promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
November, 1972, there was much criticism in Congress that the final
report254 had not been given the same wide circulation as the earlier
drafts.2s5 In what one commentator has called a "separation of pow
ers showdown,"256 the Supreme Court promulgation, which would
have been effective on July 1, 1973, was suspended by statute257 until
legislative hearings could be held. After hearings on, and significant
revisions to, the Supreme Court's version, Congress enacted "The
Federal Rules of Evidence" as a statute, effective July 1, 1975. 258
Of the revisions made by Congress, the two most significant were
in the areas of presumptions and privileges. Regarding presumptions,
the Supreme Court in its 1972 promulgation prescribed the so-called
"Morgan view" approach, which means that the effect of a presump
tion is to shift the burden of persuasion on the presumed fact to the
shoulders of the party opposing the presumption. 259 Congress, fearful
that the "Morgan view" gave too much weight to presumptions,260
instead opted for the so-called "Thayer view," under which the sole
effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of production of the pre
250. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 180.
251. A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 75 (1962).
252. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 181. The advisory committee was chaired by Al
bert E. Jenner, Jr., with Professor Edward W. Cleary as Reporter. Field, supra note 235, at

3.
253. 1969 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24; 1972 Proposed Federal Rules,
supra note 24.
254. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24.
255. Field, supra note 235, at 4 n.9.
256. Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 332 (1991).
257. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (superseded by the Federal
Rules of Evidence).
258. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified at
28 U.S.C. app. 733 (1988». Greater detail on the congressional action regarding the rules
can be found in Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 n.19.
259. See 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 336 (Rule 301). See also
Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evi
dence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 912-13 (1937).
260. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1326. For the detailed congressional treatment of
this concern, see id. at 1326 n.69.
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sumed fact to the shoulders of the party opposing the presumption.
Under the federal rule, if the opposing party produces any evidence
tending to show the non-existence of the presumed fact, the presump
tion's "bubble" bursts. 261 While Congress retained the Supreme
Court's "Erie nod" in Federal Rule 302 (allowing states to supply
their own rules regarding presumptions in civil cases),262 the House of
Representatives and Senate deleted Proposed Federal Rule 303 on pre
sumptions in criminal cases. 263
The changes wrought by Congress regarding privileges were, if
anything, more substantial. The Supreme Court had proposed a de
tailed code of privileges,264 including issues of waiver and comment on
the claim of a privilege. 265 Congress was concerned about forum
shopping between state and federal courts based upon a federal abro
gation and extension of state-derived privilege laws, many of which
were controversial,266 Accordingly, the House of Representatives and
the Senate enacted a single rule, Rule 501, which provided for privi
lege law to be governed by federal court interpretation of common law
and for another "Erie nod. "267
Despite the wrangling at the federal level, other jurisdictions be
gan to use the Federal Rules of Evidence even before those rules be
came controlling law in the federal courts. The Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence as promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1972 were
approved virtually intact by the National Conference of Commission
ers on Uniform State Laws as the "new" Uniform Rules of Evidence
in 1974, superseding the 1953 version. 268 Both New Mexico and Wis
consin adopted codifications based upon the proposed federal rules,
261. See FED. R. EVID. 301. See also JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREA
TISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW ch. 8 passim (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1898).
262. FED. R. EVID. 302 (providing that a federal court should look to the presump
tion law of a state where state law provides the rule of decision on the merits). See also
Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.75.
263. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1328 n.81.
264. 1972 Proposed Federal Rules, supra note 24, at 356-82 (Rules 501-06).
265. Id.
266. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7075; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051. See also Berger, supra note 234, at 275; Patrick, supra note 234,
at 690.
267. FED. R. EVID. 501.
268. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 n.21. Compare Unif. R. Evid. (1953) with
UNIF. R. EVID. (1974). Presumptions and privileges are treated consistently in both the
1974 Uniform Rules and the proposed federal rules as drafted by the Supreme Court.
However, Congress treated presumptions and privileges differently in the federal rules as
enacted.
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though New Mexico later confonned its rules to the versions enacted
by Congress. 269
Probably the most striking aspect of codification is the way the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the 1974 Unifonn Rules counterpart
have "caught on" over the last ten years. As of June, 1982, only eight
een states had adopted a version of the federal rules as their state evi
dence code. 270 In the ten years since the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts declined codification, that number has virtually
doubled to thirty-four,271 including Utah, which already had a code
based on the 1953 Unifonn Rules,272 and all the New England states,
except Massachusetts and Connecticut. 273 In addition, a version of
the federal rules governs proceedings in federal military courts274 and
the Commonwealth of Puerto RicO. 275 There is an effort underway to
codify a federal-rules model in Alabama. 276 New York, which de
clined codification in the early 1980's, has revived its consideration of
codification, although its current draft is based more on the fonnat
than the content of the actual federal rules. 277 Even New Jersey,
See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1319 nn.15-16.
270. Internal Memorandum of the National Center for State Courts (June 2, 1982),
cited in Healy, supra note 87, at 153 n.l3.
271. ALASKA R. EVID. 101-1101; ARIZ. R. EVID. 101-1103; ARK. R. EVID. 101
1102; COLO. R. EVID. 101-1103; DEL. R. EVID. 101-1103; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101
.958 (1979); HAW. R. EVID. 101-1102; IDAHO R. EVID. 101-1103; IOWA R. EVID. 101
1103; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 101-1103; ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; MICH. R. EVID. 101-1102;
MINN. R. EVID. 101-1101; MISS. R. EVID. 101-1103; MONT. R. EvID. 100-1008; NEB. R.
EVID. 27-101 to -1103; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-56.020 (1987); N.H. R. EVID. 100
1103; N.M. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.C. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.D. R. EVID. 101-1103; OHIO
R. EVID. 101-1103; OKLA. STAT. tit. xii, §§ 2101-3103 (1980 & Supp. 1992); OR. R. EVID.
100-1008; R.I. R. EVID. 101-1008; S.D. R. EVID. 19.1.1-.18.8; TENN. R. EVID. 101-1008;
TEX. R. CIV. EVID. 100-1008; UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103; VT. R. EVID. 101-1103; WASH.
R. EVID. 101-1103; W. VA. R. EVID. 101-1102; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (1975
& Supp. 1991); WYo. R. EVID. 101-1104.
272. Compare UTAH R. EVID. 101-1103 (effective Sept. I, 1983) with UTAH R.
EVID. 1-74.
273. ME. R. EVID. 101-1102; N.H. R. EVID. 100-1103; R.I. R. EVID. 101-1008; VT.
R. EVID. 101-1103.
274. MILITARY R. EVID. 101-1103.
275. P.R. R. EVID. 1-84.
276. See Charles W. Gamble & Russell L. Sandidge, Around and Through the
269.

Thicket of Hearsay: Dispelling Myths. Exposing Impostors and Moving Toward the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 42 ALA. L. REV. 5 (1990).
277. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMM'N, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
STATE OF NEW YORK (1991) (submitted to the 1991-92 Session of the Legislature by Gov
ernor Mario M. Cuomo). In the letter of transmittal from the commission to the Gover
nor, the commission emphasized that, unlike the 1982 proposed code, the 1991 version was
less of an attempt to "conform state law to the federal rules" and "much more a New York
Code of Evidence." Letter from Robert M. Pitler, a member of the commission, to Mario
M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York at XXI (Mar. 21, 1991). Cj Bernard S.
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which already has its own code,278 is considering a codification based
upon federal rule enumeration, but retaining state substantive provi
sions. 279 Kentucky, which has no evidence code, has developed a tra
dition of citing to and embracing individual federal rules of
evidence. 28o Illinois, which rejected a code in 1979,281 has also em
braced individual federal rules from time to time. 282 Furthermore,
while beyond our current concerns, law reform bodies in many other
countries are considering revising and codifying their evidence law. 283
Given the sheer number of federal and state courts now using a
version of the federal rules, they have truly become "the majority
view," even if no one would argue that they are perfect. 284 However,
to the extent that the federal rules have become the norm, there are
significant variations from the norm. Three compendiums discuss
these variations exhaustively,285 but some synthesis is possible.
The first major variation is the mode of enactment. Of the thirty
four codifying states, only nine codified their evidence law by stat
ute. 286 Twenty-five of those states, a substantial majority, including
Meyer & Richard T. Farrell, The New York Proposed Code 0/ Evidence: Some Background
and Some Suggestions, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1237 (1981).
278. See supra discussion accompanying notes 247-49.
279. Richard Pliskin, Federal Evidence Rules Are Model/or N.J. Plan, 129 N.J. L.J.
Index Page 491 (1991).
280. See April A. Kestel, Comment, The Kentucky Trend Toward the Federal Rules
0/ Evidence: In Which Areas Will Kentucky Law Be Changed?, 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 189
(1980).
281. Letter from Joseph H. Goldenhersh, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, to Rex Carr, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Evidence (Jan. 12, 1979).
See also John Powers Crowley, Foreword: Illinois Evidence-The Question o/Codification,
10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297 (1979).
282. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326-27 (Ill.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 836 (1981), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois expressly adopted Federal Rule
703 and Federal Rule 705 on expert testimony without ever mentioning that it declined
codification generally, just two years before.
283. These countries include, inter alia, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom. See William Twining, The New Evidence Scholarship: A Com
ment on Christopher Finlayson's "Proving Your Case-Evidence and Procedure in Action,"
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 295, 299 & n.23 (1991).
284. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FED
ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1991).
285. Wroth's article, The Federal Rules 0/ Evidence in the States: A Ten-Year Per
spective, was a magnificent effort to survey the actual enactments of the 30 states codifying
evidence law as of 1985. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1320. GREGORY P. JOSEPH & STE
PHEN A. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES
(1987 & Supp. 1991), is an even more comprehensive and current treatment.
Though purportedly a treatment of only "Uniform Rules" states, the National Confer
ence does exhaustively cover both federal and uniform rule jurisdictions. See UNIF. R.
EVID., reprinted in 13A U.L.A. (1986 & Supp. 1992).
286. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350 n.272.
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four New England states, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont,287 codified by court rule. 288
The second major variation is the extent to which the codifying
states have felt free to modify the "better-view" Federal or Uniform
Rule model to conform to pre-existing state practice-a perceived
"even-better-view."289 Many federal and/or uniform rules were
adopted nearly verbatim by all codifying states. 290 However, several
commentators have noted that nearly two-thirds of the Supreme
Court's 1972 proposed federal rules have been modified substantively
in one or more of the adopting states. 291 Apparently, only one adopt
ing state, Utah, has made fewer than ten substantial changes, and even
Utah has made five. 292 At least some states, whether by design or
oversight, have not amended their own codes to reflect later amend
ments to the federaP93 or uniform rules. 294 And, of course, individual
state acceptance or rejection in judicial opinions of federal or state ad
visory committee interpretations can create more of such
divergence. 295
The most significant substantive changes tend to revolve around
the perennial "problem children" of presumptions and privileges. 296
With respect to presumptions, the states are all over the board. Begin
ning with Rule 301, thirteen states, including New Hampshire and
287. See supra note 273. For the interaction between the legislature and the judici
ary in Vermont over the state's proposed codification, see Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350
n.273. See John A. Dooley III, The Regulation of the Practice ofLaw, Practice and Proce
dure, and Court Administration in Vermont-Judicial or Legislative Power?, 8 VT. L. REV.
211, 220 n.51 (1983).
288. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1350. Since the publication of Dean Wroth's article,
four more states have codified by court rule. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 101-1103 (West
1992); MISS. R. EVID. 101-1103; R.I. R. EVID. 100-1008; TENN. R. EVID. 101-1008.
289. A detailed discussion of reasons for variation between the federal model and
state enactments appears in Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322-24.
290. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 ("Lack of Personal Knowledge"); UNIF. R. EVID.
602 ("Lack of Personal Knowledge"); FED. R. EVID. 604 ("Interpreters"); UNIF. R. EVID.
604 ("Interpreters"). See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, §§ 36.2, 38.2.
291. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322; Graham, supra note 234, at 308.
292. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322 n.43; Graham, supra note 234, at 308.
293. Graham, supra note 234, at 307.
294. A number of uniform rules were amended by the National Conference in 1986.
,For a convenient summary, see the prefatory note to the 1986 amendments to the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 13A U.L.A. (1986).
295. See Graham, supra note 234, at 308. One example Professor Graham uses here
is the variation among the states on the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures
under Federal Rule 407 on liability issues in products liability cases, an issue that has vexed
the federal circuit courts as well. Id. See Wendy Bugher Greenley, Note, Federal Rule of
Evidence 407: New Controversy Besets the Admissibility ofSubsequent Remedial Measures,
30 VILL. L. REV. 1611 (1985).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 259-67.
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Vermont, have adopted the federal rule, "Thayer view" of presump
tions. 297 However, twelve states, including Maine, have adopted a
proposed federal rule, "Morgan view" of presumptions. 298 Four, in
cluding Rhode Island, have adopted detailed rules on presumptions,
depending on the presumption involved. 299 Five states have adopted
no codified rules on presumptions. 3°O One state even adopted a pre
sumption rule that preserves existing presumption law. 30 ! There is
comparable confusion over Rules 302 and 303. 302
If the codifying states are all over the board regarding presump
tions, they are all over the universe regarding privileges. Fourteen
states have enacted Federal Rule SOlon privileges, thus leaving privi
lege law to constitutional, statutory, and common-law recognition and
development.303 Eighteen states, including Maine, New Hampshire,
and Vermont, have enacted some version of Proposed Federal Rule
501 (also the current Uniform Rule)304 which provides an exclusive
"laundry list" of privileges and thus bars evolutionary common-law
development of privilege. 305 However, many of these latter states, in
cluding New Hampshire and Vermont, have expanded or contracted,
or deleted and replaced, the privileges on the laundry list,306 resulting
in a "crazy quilt" of privilege rules from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Two other codifying states have adopted no privilege rule whatso
ever,307 with Rhode Island tersely expressing an unmistakable desire
in Rule 501 of its code to avoid any modification or supersession of
existing state privilege law. 308
Despite this diversity in the mode of enactment and substantive
content of many supposedly "code" provisions, there is remarkably
little modern scholarly opposition to codification of evidence law. 309
297. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.70.
298. Id. at 1327 n.71; 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 8.2.
299. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.72; R.1. R. EVID. 301-07.
300. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.73; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. 301-03 (re
served) (West 1992); TENN. R. EVID. art. III (reserved).
301. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327 n.74; IOWA R. EVID. 301.
302. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1327-29.
303. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2.
304. UNIF. R. EVID. 501 (1974).
305. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2.
306. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1334-36.
307. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 23.2.
308. R.I. R. EVID. 501.
309. The major piece opposing codification is Graham, supra note 234. Even Profes
sor Graham, however, seems more ambivalent than opposed to codification, his ambiva
lence growing from his pessimism on whether codification can ever achieve the goals set for
it. Accord Younger, supra note 234, at 252-54. See also Richard S. Walinski & Howard
Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
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Scholarly review of codification tends to be favorable, whether viewed
prospectively toward codification,310 concurrently with codification,311
or retrospectively with the benefit of ten years of intra-jurisdiction ex
perience under codification. 312 Also, the fact remains that thirty-four
states have substantially adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as
their state evidence law, and no state that has codified on a federal
rules model has ever "decodified" (at least, not intentionally).313 The
next section of this Article will argue why Massachusetts should re
consider its decision not to codify its evidence law.
IV.
A.

WHY MASSACHUSETIS SHOULD CODIFY

Uniformity

The first reason Massachusetts should codify its evidence law is to
provide uniformity.314 Admittedly, uniformity is more important in
the federal court system (where federal trial judges in different states
otherwise might apply different evidence law)315 than for any given
state court system (where presumably every trial judge is applying that
state's evidence law). And it may seem odd given the diversity that
exists between "codifications" based on the federal rules model to raise
uniformity as a factor in codification at all. 316 However, uniformity
can be an advantage of codification without literal and total uniformREV. 344, 367-87 (1978) (arguing that increased admissibility coupled with enhanced trial
court discretion does not automatically lead to better adjudications on the merits).
310. Gamble & Sandidge, supra note 276, at 8.
311. See, e.g., Field, supra note 236, at 224.
312. Berger, supra note 234, at 264-69 (10 years of codification in federal court);
Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370-76 (10 years of codification in federal court); Whinery,
supra note 234, at 194-96 (10 years of codification in the Oklahoma state courts).
313. The somewhat embarrassing quasi-exception is Arkansas. One of the states that
enacted a code by statute, Arkansas discovered 10 years later that its legislature was unlaw
fully in session at the time the code was passed. Rather than risk chaos in its judicial
system, the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted a codification as court rule to fill the gap.
See Ricarte v. State, 717 S.W.2d 488 (Ark. 1986).
314. Whinery, supra note 234, at 194.
315. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 181. Indeed, "for the first 150 years of the 200
year history of federal courts, things were the reverse of what they are today. Before 1938,
the federal courts followed state procedural law and federal substantive law, even in diver
sity cases." Baker, supra note 256, at 325-26. It is thus ironic that a major argument for a
given state to codify its evidence law on a federal rules model is to regain the intrastate
uniformity that existed prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
316. This "diversity of codification" deflates the argument that codification on a fed
eral rules model could lead to the nationwide law of evidence being disproportionately
influenced by the oligarchical few in charge of the federal rules, the fear being that the
states would follow federal evidence law developments in a "sheep-like" manner. See Gra
ham, supra note 234, at 297-98.
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ity of language in every state and federal court. 317 Even allowing for
local variation, in nearly all the code jurisdictions there is now a con
sistent format and organizational plan of evidence with identical or
nearly identical numbering systems; typical substantive provisions in
identical or nearly identical language; and agreement on the evidence
topics that are to be included and excluded from the body of the code
itself.318 This "relative" uniformity permits a more thorough analysis
of already codified provisions319 without the wasteful "sorting and
comparison of variant rules"320 across common-l;;tw jurisdictions.
The failure of the codes to be exhaustively inclusive is not a death
knell to uniformity. As one commentator has observed, "when we
speak of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counterparts as a
'code,' we are not using the term in the same sense ... as the Bank
ruptcy Code, or the Internal Revenue Code, or even the Uniform
Commercial Code."321 The evidence codes do not deal with every sit
uation, and they contain standards rather than absolute rules. 322 The
focus tends to be on the most significant areas of admission of proof at
trial as well as those most in need of clarification or reform,323 with the
opportunity for judicial interpolation to fill any gaps.324
When it declined to adopt the proposed Massachusetts rules, the
Supreme Judicial Court recognized uniformity of practice in federal
and state courts to be a "valid objective" of codification. 325 While
"uniformity" was not included within the code values of fairness, effi
ciency, and progress,326 uniformity enhances all three values. 327 Con
sistency across the states tends to avoid the injustices created by
primitive choice-of-Iaw rules in interstate evidence problems. 328 It
also eases the transition of lawyers from state to state. 329 Uniformity
317. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322.
31S. Id. at 134S. But see Younger, supra note 234, at 254 n.17 ("The prudence of
uniformity of practice between federal and state courts is hardly self-evident. And if the
[Federal] Rules were folly to begin with, their replication among the states would not make
them wise. ").
319. Tollison, supra note 234, at 57.
320. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1349.
321. Berger, supra note 234, at 255.
322. Id.
323. Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1373.
324. For a thoughtful approach to filling such gaps, see id. at 1374-76.
325. SJC Announcement, supra note I.
326. FED. R. EVlD. 102 ("Purpose and Construction").
327. Graham, supra note 234, at 299-301.
32S. Id. at 300 & n.25.
329. See Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370. There are those who challenge the im
portance of this factor. See Graham, supra note 234, at 297.
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benefits the attorney with clients in several different code states,330 a
situation that occurs frequently in Massachusetts, given that all but
one of the neighboring New England states is now a code
jurisdiction. 331
Uniformity between federal and state courts within a state eases
the transition of lawyers within the forum,332 and encourages attor
neys to practice in both state and federal venues. 333 While the diver
sity of provisions across the code states might give rise to some fears of
forum-shopping among the courts of different states,334 forum-shop
ping on evidence issues between state and federal courts within the
same state is unlikely for several reasons. First, most attorneys do not
do their "shopping" based on the rules of evidence;335 rather, they
shop based upon considerations of the predispositions of likely judges
and the composition of typical jury panels. Second, uniformity of evi
dence laws between state and federal courts in the same forum would
discourage shopping by removing its incentives336 and at worst would
not encourage shopping beyond what is already available. 337
As with many qualities that are difficult to quantify, however, the
ultimate beauty of codifying evidence law on a federal rules model can
be appreciated best by metaphor. Think of the common law as Latin,
and the federal rules as English. Continued adherence to the common
law in evidentiary matters is essentially adherence to a dead language,
and the beauty of codification is that everyone would be speaking Eng
lish, even if the "idioms" of the code from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
vary the way English does from Australia to Alabama. In fact, given
the diversity within the codes nationwide, Massachusetts can choose
its own code idioms within the basic organizational plan.
330. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322.
331. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
332. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1322. At least one commentator doubts that many
lawyers actually practice in both federal and state courts or that their impact on the rules
would be very substantial. Graham, supra note 234, at 296.
333. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 194 n.79; Tollison, supra note 234, at 62.
334. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, at v.
335. Patrick, supra note 234, at 670.
336. Tollison, supra note 234, at 57.
337. "Erie nods" in Federal Rules of Evidence 302 ("Presumptions"), 501 ("Privi
leges"), and 601 ("Competency of Witnesses") already discourage forum-shopping based
on evidence considerations, because the federal courts look to the state view under these
rules in diversity and supplemental subject matter jurisdiction cases, the most likely candi
dates for forum-shopping. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1367 (1988). See supra text accompany
ing notes 262, 267. However, the obvious differences between the federal rules and current
Massachusetts practice would stiII offer possible considerations for the attorney who wished
to forum-shop. See generally Hughes et aI., supra note 8.
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Having conceded that Massachusetts can vary from the federal
rules model, a reconsideration of codification for the commonwealth,
sadly, must begin with a new proposed code. This is true for several
reasons. First, the Supreme Judicial Court was correct in assaying
that the 1980 Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence departed sig
nificantly and controversially from their federal counterparts. 338 A
state code more closely patterned after the federal one is more sensi
ble. 339 Second, to the extent that Massachusetts would want to depart
from the federal model on specific code provisions, the drafters of the
proposed code did not have the benefit of comparing and evaluating
the codes of three of the four now-codified New England states, be
cause those three jurisdictions codified after the Supreme Judicial
Court rejected the proposed Massachusetts rules in 1982.340 Further,
two major compendiums of code jurisdictions nationwide would pro
vide even more opportunities for comparison,341 through a "head
count" of the codifying states on each evidence topic in the code. 342
Third, there have been a number of amendments to, and interpreta
tions of, both the federaP43 and uniform rules 344 that any advisory
committee drafting a new Massachusetts code would want to consider.
For instance, any new advisory committee automatically should in
clude one pervasive amendment to the federal rules, the "gender-neu
tralization" changes. 345 Fourth, drafters would want to review a
number of post-1980 decisions under Massachusetts common law, es
pecially those dealing with the original proposed Massachusetts
338. SJC Announcement, supra note 1. See also 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra
note 285, at v ("It can matter, and matter a lot, which version of the Rules a state has
adopted. ").
339. Gamble & Sandidge, supra note 276, at 8; Tollison, supra note 234, at 62. In
addition to the other advantages discussed, if Massachusetts had a code based on the fed
eral rules, and a given Massachusetts rule of evidence were to be part of an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the nation's highest Court would be hard-pressed to
overturn on some constitutional ground a state court rule identical to its own federal rule
on the issue. See Kestel, supra note 280, at 193.
340. Although Maine codified in 1976, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island
did not codify until 1983, 1985, and 1987, respectively. See 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT, 1047-49 (1989).
341. See JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285; Wroth, supra note 234.
342. The Supreme Judicial Court used this "head-count" approach in evaluating
Proposed Massachusetts Rule 801(d)(I)(A) in the Daye case. See supra text accompany
ing note 157; Commonwealth v. Daye, 469 N.E.2d 483,493 n.14 (Mass. 1984).
343. See. e.g.• FED. R. EVID. 609(a) ("Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of
Crime"); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (preserving the opportunity to impeach
by bias even though no federal rule of evidence expressly permits such mode of
impeachment).
344. See supra note 294.
345. See FED. R. EVID. 101-1103.
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code. 346 Presumably, any new advisory committee should be consti
tuted with both continuity and diversity in mind. 347 To avoid cita
tional confusion with the earlier effort, a new codification might be
designated the "Suggested Massachusetts Rules of Evidence."

B. Rationality and Modernity
Massachusetts also should codify its evidence law based on a fed
eral rules model because of considerations of rationality and moder
nity. Even if uniformity with practice in the federal courts alone is
unpersuasive, Massachusetts should use the federal code as a model
because it remains the most recent and thorough re-evaluation of the
law of evidence.348 The Commonwealth already has modernized its
rules of procedure based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,349
and "rules of evidence are inextricably bound up with rules of proce
dure."35o Accordingly, codifying using the federal evidence model
would permit rational interlocking of already cross-referenced rules
using similar language to mean similar things. Also, the basic premise
underlying the federal evidence code "is that there should be a greater
liberality in the admission of evidence."351 The premise is grounded
on the greater educational and culturai understanding of modem ju
rors when compared to their eighteenth century counterparts in Eng
land. 352 This should be especially true in Massachusetts, which uses
the "one-day, one-trial" system for its juries,353 thereby assuring that
virtually everyone, including judges and law professors,354 will be eli
346. See generally supra text accompanying notes 98-233.
347. Continuity would be advanced by including at least one member from the origi
nal committee. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Diversity would be ad
vanced by considerations of gender, race, geography (both in the sense of the areas of the
state and of size of municipality within the state), type of employment (government and
private, academic and judicial), type of litigation practice (civil and crimina!), and perhaps
other characteristics as well. See also Tollison, supra note 234, at 65-66 (suggestions on the
composition of the advisory committee for Mississippi).
348. Field, supra note 235, at 3 (quoting Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of Evi
dence-An Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1061
(1969)).
349. Hennessey, supra note 98, at 7. See MASS. R. CIV. P.; MASS. R. DOM. REL. P.;
DIST./MUN. CTs. R. CIV. P.
350. Tollison, supra note 234, at 53.
351. Field, supra note 235; at 4.
352. Id.
353. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 234A, §§ 1-80 (1990).
354. When the author of this Article was called for jury service in an attempted
murder trial in Suffolk County (Boston), the trial judge asked the jury pool as a whole if
anyone could not sit on the jury. I raised my hand, and at a bench conference the trial
judge reminded me about the importance of everyone serving as a juror. He then asked for
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gible for jury service.
The codification of evidence law would help the Commonwealth
jettison irrational practices based upon old precedents. 355 Two prac
tices in Massachusetts that fit this category are the rule that a party
can impeach his or her own witnesses only by prior inconsistent state
ment 356 and the practice of allowing proponents of an otherwise inad
missible document to offer the document into evidence when it is used
to refresh a witness' memory and the opponent demands to see it.357
Also, by codifying rationally, the court could avoid accidental, unde
sired codification. 358
As indicated earlier, however, a majority of the Supreme Judicial
Court was concerned "that promulgation of rules of evidence would
tend to restrict the development of common-law principles pertaining
to the admission of evidence."359 Opponents of codification often raise
this argument using Judge Henry Friendly's classic statement "[w]hen
it is not necessary to do anything, it is necessary to do nothing."360
However, the next natural question, which the Supreme Judicial Court
did not ask, is: "What is the purpose of common-law development?"
Presumably, that purpose is to modernize by reform those evidence
rules which have become outdated. However, it is nearly impossible
to modernize evidence law through common-law development. 361
Case law fails to keep pace with the thousands of practical problems of
admissibility that arise each day in trials. 362
The reasons for this failure are fairly simple. First, the common
law system is subject to the vagaries of which cases get appealed. Liti
gators tend to focus on the result in the case, not pressing or even
preserving fine points of evidence law. 363 Second, even an ardent liti
my excuse. I replied, "Your Honor, when the prosecutor was in law school, I taught him
Evidence." Without batting an eye, the trial judge asked me, "How'd he do?"
355. Whinery, supra note 234, at 195.
356. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 23 (1990). See LIACOS, supra note 2, at 159-61.
357. Leonard v. Taylor, 53 N.E.2d 705 (Mass. 1944). See LIACOS, supra note 2, at
444-45.
358. One expert commenting on possible codification in North Carolina noted that
North Carolina hearsay law had been affected by the Federal Rules of Evidence even
though the state had not yet codified and suggested that an evidence code would be needed
in order to prevent unwelcome changes in existing state law. Walter J. Blakey, Moving
Towards an Evidence Law of General Principles: Several Suggestions Concerning an Evi
dence Code for North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1,9-17 (1981).
359. SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
360. 120 CONGo REC. 1415 (1974) (statement of Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman, quoting
Judge Friendly).
361. Field, supra note 235, at 2; Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370.
362. See Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370.
363. Field, supra note 235, at 2.
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gator will recognize and abandon harmless error when he or she sees
it. 364 Third, trial judges are unlikely to depart from even old prece
dents,365 thus compounding the first two problems.
By contrast to the haphazard approach of the common law, codi
fication can modernize evidence law immediately, comprehensively,
and consistently.366 Indeed, one commentator believes that the best
argument in favor of codification is its capacity to be a vehicle for the
thorough reform of a jurisdiction's law of evidence. 367 Even though
some states that have codified their evidence law have chosen different
treatment of an individual rule than the federal code, the codification
effort itself forces rethinking of evidence concepts and consequently
modernizes them. 368
We also should be clear that codification is not the end of the
process of analyzing evidence concepts, but rather a new beginning. 369
Even a "modem" code will not be perfect, and even if perfect, could
not stay perfect. As time goes on, courts will have to interpret ambi
guities, challenge anachronisms, and perhaps suggest amendments to
the code. 370 The beauty of a code is that such problem areas tend to
be highlighted rather quickly and clearly because everyone is studying
and arguing the same code phrases.
This is one aspect of codification as to which the Supreme Judi
cial Court somewhat missed the point, as reflected by two of its state
ments in the announcement declining to implement the proposed
Massachusetts code. On the one hand, "some of the Justices [believed
that] the Federal Rules of Evidence have not led to uniform practice in
the various federal courtS."371 This is certainly true, in the sense that
federal courts have disagreed on several issues not expressly dealt with
m the code, such as whether the exclusion of subsequent remedial
364. Patrick, supra note 234, at 673 (noting that the operation of the harmless error
rule results in few reversals on points of evidence).
365. Field, supra note 235, at 2. The author of that article went on to observe that
"[ilt was a standard joke in Massachusetts, where the writer practiced for many years, to
give the most credit in reform of evidence law to a judge who several times unintentionally
failed to abide by precedent and then was affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court." Id. at
2 n.3.
366. Id. at 2; Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1371.
367. Patrick, supra note 234, at 670.
368. Saitzburg, supra note 234, at 187.
369. Tollison, supra note 234, at 66.
370. See, for example, the discussion of possible amendments to the Federal Rules of
Evidence on the occasion of their tenth birthday in Berger, supra note 234, at 273 -76. One
opponent of codification is less sanguine about the evolution of law under an evidentiary
code system. See Graham, supra note 234, at 313 -14.
371. SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
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measures to prove liability as provided by Rule 407 applies in products
liability cases. 372 However, it is precisely this focus on problem areas
that has encouraged and guided several codifying states to include in
their Rule 407 an express provision dealing with the products liability
question. 373 Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court's second statement,
that "the Federal Rules ... are, in some instances, less well adapted to
the needs of modem trial practice than current Massachusetts law,"374
is also misplaced. If Massachusetts disagrees with the federal treat
ment of a given evidence concept, then the Commonwealth should,
and can, change that concept within the Massachusetts code. This
rational kind of change can have greater ramifications than mere in
trajurisdictional satisfaction. For example, a number of states inserted
within their Rule 404(b) a provision that the proponent (usually the
prosecutor in a criminal case) of prior bad acts evidence must give pre
trial notice to the opponent of the intention to offer such evidence. 375
Effective December 1, 1991, a similar notice provision was inserted in
the federal rule. 376 Thus, the states that have codified can act not only
for their own good but also as a "laboratory" for extrajurisdictional
guidance as well. 377
This "laboratory" perspective is an important one. Jurisdictions
considering a codification based primarily on their own existing law of
evidence (currently, New Jersey and New York)378 do not risk merely
restating their evidence law instead of reforming it. Those jurisdic
tions deprive themselves of participating in the nationwide experimen
tation under federal model codes and therefore risk dooming
themselves to evidential eccentricity and eventual irrelevance nation
ally. By contrast, the states codifying based on a federal rules model
enjoy the opportunity to consult the similarly structured jurisprudence
of other codifying states and the federal courts as well. 379 The "fed
372. See Berger, supra note 234, at 265-66.
373. Maine and Rhode Island reversed the federal rule by admitting evidence of sub
sequent remedial measures in virtually all cases. However, six states that follow the policy
of the federal rule have "express" provisions for products liability cases; Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, and Texas admit such measures, while Nebraska and Tennessee exclude them. See 1
JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 17.2.
374. SJC Announcement, supra note 1.
375. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, § 14.2 n.6. The states are Florida,
Tennessee, and Texas (the last in criminal cases only). The approaches to the "notice"
issue of several other states are gathered in Graham, supra note 234, at 309.
376. H.R. Doc. No. 102-76, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
377. 1 JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285, at iv-v.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 277-79.
379. Tollison, supra note 234, at 54-55. But see Graham, supra note 234, at 313
("One sees in the state court opinions a slight but gradually increasing tendency to cite the

46

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

eral-rules-as-model" is not just the coming thing; as the evidence foun
dation for thirty-four states, it is the "arrived" thing. Massachusetts,
with no homegrown codification and no plans for one, will benefit
most by joining the interstate federation of laboratories on a federal
rules model as soon as possible.
C.

Accessibility and Competency

Massachusetts should codify for reasons of accessibility and com
petency as well. The code advantage of accessibility is recognized by
skeptics,380 and even opponents,381 of codification. A commcmtator on
one state's ten-year experience with an evidence code believes that ac
cessibility is "perhaps the greatest virtue" of codification.382
The major problem of accessibility in common-law states like
Massachusetts is that the "law" of evidence is scattered throughout
dozens of volumes of statutes and hundreds of volumes of reporters. 383
It is, quite simply, very difficult for attorneys and judges to "find"
evidence law in a common-law jurisdiction. 384 By comparison, the
federal rules, by reducing most of the law of evidence to a single docu
ment, has provided a "clearly lit landscape" for participants in litiga
tion. 385 The eleven articles of a federal rules code are an integrated
system, so that the answer to an evidence question often lies in a rela
tively easy interplay of several different rules. 386 Even if an evidence
issue is not covered in the code, at least all participants can discover
this and research accordingly. 387
Accessibility also enhances lawyer competency. By express
Supreme Judicial Court rule, attorneys in Massachusetts are charged
federal case law in construing state versions of the Federal Rules-but very little citation of
the cases and statutes of other states."). However, in that same 1990 article, the commen
tator suggests that a possible reason for the relative lack of State A's citation to State B's
code is the absence of State B's evidence materials from State A's libraries. Id. at 313.
Given that the Wroth compendium was published only five years before the commentator's
article, and the more comprehensive compendium by Joseph and Saltzburg only three years
prior, it is hoped that more and more "State A's" will have access to, and desire to benefit
from, "State B's" evidence code materials. See supra notes 234-85.
380. See Younger, supra note 234, at 254.
381. See Graham, supra note 234, at 312-13.
382. Whinery, supra note 234, at 255.
383. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 234, at 283; Field, supra note 235, at 2; Patrick,
supra note 234, at 669; Whinery, supra note 234, at 195.
384. Berger, supra note 234, at 261; Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 192. But see
HUGHES, supra note 2 (1992 Supplement attempts to organize existing Massachusetts evi
dence law within a code format).
385. Younger, supra note 234, at 254.
386. Patrick, supra note 234, at 674.
387. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184 n.48.
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to act competently in cases they handle. 388 Under the format of a fed
eral rules model, the attorney knows where to look for an evidence
concept. This is the case even if the actual content of the rule is differ
ent from the federal version. 389 Regardless of whether the "better"
view is to admit or exclude a given piece of evidence, a code is the best
place to make that decision and to make it with clarity.390
In addition to easy accessibility pre-trial, the code also provides
the litigator with that vital, quick accessibility to an evidentiary rule
during a trial or other proceeding. This is the so-called "pocket bi
ble"391 advantage, praised by some 392 and questioned by others. 393
Obviously, detailed research and motions in limine might produce a
"perfect" evidentiary trial. However, the beauty of the pocket bible is
that during the heat of a contested hearing on an unanticipated issue
of evidence law, many variables can be eliminated and more "correct"
trial-level rulings are likely.394 This should enhance not only the ac
tual competence of lawyers in the courtroom, but also the equally im
portant aspect of apparent competence of lawyers in the one venue in
which the general public sees the law presented. 395
A code of evidence based on the federal rules also enhances law
yer competency by allowing attorneys to understand an evidence con
cept once it is found. All litigators will be starting their evidence
arguments using the same black-letter rules. 396 Furthermore, most at
388. MASS. S.J.C. R. 3:07, DR 6-101.
389. Graham, supra note 234, at 312-13.
390. Cf Berger, supra note 234, at 265-67.
391. Tollison, supra note 234, at 56.
392. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184.
393. Graham, supra note 234, at 314. One danger of the "pocket bible" approach is
that attorneys may tend to rely on the code itself and fail to keep abreast of the case law
interpreting it. While this is a danger for codes in any area of the law, the same danger
exists for the lawyer practicing in a common-law evidence state who fails to Shepardize a
common-law precedent.
394. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 184.
395. Healy, supra note 87, at 153; Tollison, supra note 234, at 57.
In judging the law's handling of its tasks of fact-finding in the [trial] setting, it is
necessary always to bear in mind that this is a last ditch process in which some
thing more is at stake than truth only of a specific matter in contest. There is at
stake also that confidence of the public generally in the impartiality and the fair
ness of public settlement of disputes which is essential if the ditch is to be held
and the settlements accepted peaceably.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, Evidence and Inference in the Law,
87(4) DAEDALUS 40, 45 (1958).
This concern with the appearance of lawyer competency can only increase as the tele
vising of trials, including those taking place in Massachusetts, becomes more pervasive. See
Dick Dahl, Cable Goes to Court, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 1229 (1992).
396. See Berger, supra note 234, at 260-61; Tollison, supra note 234, at 57.
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torneys in the commonwealth entered practice after 1975, the effective
date of the federal rules. 397 Upon publication in the late 1960's, the
preliminary drafts of the proposed federal rules "overnight ... super
seded the Model Code and 1953 Uniform Rules as teaching tools."398
By 1978, law schools were using the federal rules more and more,399
and by 1984, virtually all evidence casebooks used the federal rules as
"a point of departure,"400 a condition which persists today.401 Ac
cordingly, most attorneys now in practice were "brought up" using
the federal rules as the law of evidence, and in not too many more
years the same will be true of most judges.
Once found and understood, a code also contributes to compe
tency by allowing the attorney to update the applicable code provision
relatively easily. Law review surveys on evidence law from code juris
dictions are more easily scanned and digested than those from com
mon-law states. 402 Even in the absence of such surveys, computerized
legal research makes updating a rule with a given designation much
easier than linking "buzz words" under an amorphous common-law
397. There were approximately 45,000 attorneys registered in Massachusetts as of
March, 1992. Telephone interview, Board of Bar Overseers, Registration Division (Mar. 5,
1992). The board does not maintain statistical records of how many practitioners qualified
after certain dates. However, the writer was admitted to the Massachusetts bar in January,
1974, and remembers its total size as being approximately 20,000 members in the mid
1970's. Therefore, most of today's 45,000 Massachusetts attorneys were admitted to the
bar after the federal rules became effective on July 1, 1975. Nationwide, more than 50%
of 1984's lawyers had been admitted to the bar since 1975. See Berger, supra note 234, at
257.
398. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1318.
399. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 185-86.
400. Berger, supra note 234, at 257.
401. See, e.g., RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., EVIDENCE IN THE NINETIES (3d ed.
1991); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS, PROBLEMS
(2d ed. 1989); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER
THE RULES (1988).
The writer is also informed by his colleagues who teach courses other than Evidence,
both in Massachusetts and elsewhere, that they must make use of the Federal Rules of
Evidence when evidentiary issues arise in their courses simply because many of them at
tended law school or practiced law outside of their current state. They can rely on the
federal rules being taught in virtually all law schools, including the ones at which they
currently teach.
402. With all respect to the following authors, compare, for example, Dale A. Brus
chi, Evidence, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1131 (1991) (Florida, a code state), and James A. Adams,
Admissibility of Proof of an Assault Victim's Specific Instances of Conduct as an Essential
Element ofa Self-Defense Claim Under Iowa Rule ofEvidence 405,39 DRAKE L. REV. 401
(1989-90) (Iowa, a code state), with Robert V. Dewey, Jr. & Stephen J. Heine, Survey of
Illinois Law-Evidence, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 997 (1991) (Illinois, a common-law state), and
Mlfc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 42 MERCER L. REV. 223 (1990) (Georgia, a common-law
st~te).
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concept.403 Also, for those practitioners who are not "computer-liter
ate," Shepard's Evidence Citations performs the same function, albeit
more slowly, for an adopted code,404 an advantage even the proposed
Massachusetts rules cannot offer.4OS Further, a code of evidence oper
ative in State A is usually annotated and thus usually can be found
both in State A and in State B.406 However, often a treatise on evi
dence from a common-law jurisdiction is not available in the libraries
of other states,407 and even if an extensive treatise of the common law
of State A is available in the libraries of both State A and State B, that
treatise may be awkwardly out-of-date.408 Indeed, one can argue that
when the federal court in Siguel 409 "missed" the Supreme Judicial
Court's decision in Ruszcyk,410 it was not because the Massachusetts
court adopted a Proposed Massachusetts Rule of Evidence, but rather
because that adoption could not easily be found by a federal court
given the Massachusetts common-law system of evidence. A concur
rent advantage to Massachusetts codifying on a federal-rules model is
that the commonwealth's evidence law would be included in the major
compendiums of code states411 and thus be available to all, both inside
and outside Massachusetts.
D.

Certainty and Flexibility

Finally, Massachusetts should codify its evidence law for reasons
of certainty and ftexibility.412 At first it would seem that these two
aspects of the admission of evidence are antithetical. After all, more
certainty for litigators in the admissibility of evidence would mean less
403. See, for example, the WESTLAW explanation of computer updating for a given
federal rule of evidence in HUGHES, supra note 2, at VIII-IX.
404. See. e.g., SHEPARD'S EVIDENCE CITATIONS (1991).
405. SHEPARD'S does not "pick up" the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence,
apparently because the proJXY;OO rules were never enacted. See. e.g., the citations to "Mas
sachUsetts Court Rules" in SHEPARD'S MASSACHUSETTS CITATIONS, STATUTE EDmON
859-92 passim (6th ed. 1986) (no references to the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of
Evidence).
406. A compendium such as the one by Joseph and Saltzburg could prove to be
helpful in this respect. See supra note 285.
407. Graham, supra note 234, at 313.
408. This is the situation with the traditional "bible" for Massachusetts evidence
law, PAUL J. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1981 & Supp.
1985). The principal volume is 11 years old, and the most recent supplement is seven years
old.
409. See supra text accompanying notes 220-29.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 173-86.
411. For example, Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Tennessee have all recently codified
and have been included in the compendium by Joseph and Saltzburg. See supra note 285.
412. Whinery, supra note 234, at 196-97.
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flexibility for trial judges in ruling on evidence, while more flexibility
for trial judges in ruling on evidence would mean less certainty for
litigators in the admissibility of evidence. However, in a code context,
certainty and flexibility in fact work together symbiotically.
It is demonstrably clear that codification enhances certainty in
evidentiary rulings. 413 As already discussed, a code requires all par
ticipants to start from the same black-letter rules,414 thus encouraging
a marshalling of arguments and facts head-to-head and avoiding the
frequent, common-law sensation of ships passing in the night. An ad
vocate armed with a black-letter rule is much better positioned to en
lighten an inexperienced trial judge. The nightmare of the inconsistent
or idiosyncratic trial judge is noted almost universally as a problem in
common-law jurisdictions. 41s However, to some extent that
nightmare, while real, is not the individual jUrist's fault. After all,
without a code, and perhaps only decades-old, vague precedents to
guide him or her, it is no wonder that a trial judge would idiosyncrati
cally develop a set of his or her "own" rules. 416 These idiosyncracies
are relatively easy to "hide" under a common-law system due to the
harmless error doctrine and the relatively unsupervised exercise of dis
cretion. 417 However, any such idiosyncracy rapidly dissipates under
codification, where there is no question what the "rule" of evidence on
most given points actually "is." Motions in limine will be needed less
frequently, but when brought can be more directly focused. This cer
tainty of rule also substantially ameliorates the "equal protection"
problem of litigants having the admissibility of their evidence, and
therefore the outcome of their case, depend upon which judge they
draw. 418 The trial judge who stubbornly insists upon imposing his or
her own regime despite codification can be quickly and clearly identi
fied by the express code mandates he or she fails to honor, and thus
can be "rechanneled" into code compliance on appea1. 419 It will take
some time to adjust to codification, during which time there may be an
increase in litigation on evidentiary questions. 42o On the whole, how
ever, the trial courts should be able to avoid time-sapping wrangling
Patrick, supra note 234, at 669-70.
414. See supra text accompanying note 396.
415. Schmertz, supra note 234, at 1370; Tollison, supra note 234, at SO.
416. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 189.
417. Patrick, supra note 234, at 673.
418. Tollison, supra note 234, at SO.
419. "Rules of court have the force of law and may not be disregarded by an individ
ual judge." Empire Apartments, Inc. v. Gray, 231 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Mass. 1967).
420. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 187.
413.
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over code-covered evidence oiferings,421 and the appellate system will
be burdened less by unnecessary appeals. 422
Certainty also produces better advice to clients. 423 The more pre
dictable the trial jUdge's-any trial judge's-eventual ruling can be,
the more accurate will be the litigator's assessment of the trial result.
Therefore, settlements under a code will tend to be "better"424 (i.e.,
more reflective of the actual result should the case be tried to judg
ment), and alternative dispute resolution options will be more likely
vehicles for determination without a formal trial. 425
However, certainty under a code system does not put the trial
judge in a straitjacket. In much the same way that the code allows
more evidence to be heard by the modem, more educated juror, the
code also provides the modem trial judge with substantial discre
tion,426 often more discretion than under parallel common-law sys
tems. The difference is that the trial judge in a code state is usually
given more guidelines for his or her discretion427 and is frequently re
quired to provide reasons for exercising that discretion,428 thereby en
suring a more informed set of litigators at the trial level and a sharper,
more defined record on appeal. 429 While difficult to substantiate sta
tistically, "the general sense seems to be that the [federal r]utes' prefer
ence for flexibility ... worked well over [its first] decade in the federal
421. Id.; Tollison, supra note 234, at SO.
422. Tollison, supra note 234, at S6. After a decade of experience under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, a sampling of appealed cases showed very few reversals occurring at the
appellate level on evidentiary grounds. See Berger, supra note 234, at 264.
423. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 187; Tollison, supra note 234, at SS.
424. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 188; Tollison, supra note 234, at SS.
42S. Alternative dispute resolution options have become more important for both
cases under "Time Standards" and cases which predate the imposition of time standards.
See, e.g., Mark Mason, Bills Would Expand Use 0/ ADR in State Courts, 20 MASS. LAW.
WKLY. 1021 (1992); Susan R. Boyle, Suffolk Begins Construction ADR Program, 20 MASS.
LAW. WKLY. 829 (1992); Rouse Repons Reduction in Backlog, 20 MASS. LAW. WKLY. 860
(1992).
Massachusetts also must weigh the far-reaching impact of the recent trial court unifi
cation proposal. See HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., JUSTICE ENDANGERED: A MANAGE
MENT STUDY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS TRIAL CoURT (1991) (final report prepared for the
Coalition for the Courts, Apr. 16, 1991). No bill involving the unification proposal was
enacted during the 1991 legislative session. Barbara Rabinovitz, Compo Gets Overhaul. But
Courts Untouched, 20 MAss. LAW. WKLY. 697 (1992). However, should any such bill be
passed this year, the need for a standardized code of evidence and alternative dispute reso
lution options may become crucial to the ability of unified courts to function.
426. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 190.
427. Patrick, supra note 234. at 673. See the extensive lists of discretionary rules
with their guidelines in Field, supra note 236, at 207 n.24 (Maine Rules of Evidence), and
in Healy. supra note 87, at IS3 n.9 (Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence).
428. Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 190.
429. See Field, supra note 23S, at S.

52

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

courtS."430 There seems to be no reason to believe the carefully se
lected431 trial judges in Massachusetts would not also use this flexibil
ity wisely.
The above arguments on uniformity, rationality and modernity,
accessibility and competence, and certainty and flexibility make a
compelling case for codification. Even if still resistant, however, any
opponents of codification must deal with one unavoidable reality of
litigation life: even in a common-law jurisdiction, every participant in
the trial process does use a "code." The problem is, that we all use
different codes. 432 Some use the federal rules, others use the proposed
Massachusetts rules. Some turn to a persuasive but not controlling
outside treatise, others use a comprehensive but outdated in-state trea
tise. Still others rely dangerously on terse and often test-oriented bar
review materials or evidence class outlines. The bottom line is that all
of us need a code, something to turn to for evidentiary guidance, and
the importance of all of us using the same code, based on a format
shared by thirty-four sister states and the entire federal system, seems
obvious.
V.

A.

REMAINING ISSUES TOWARD CODIFICATION

Promulgation by Judiciary or Legislature

As indicated above,433 a new advisory committee will have to
draft a new code for Massachusetts. Presumably such a committee
should be appointed by the branch of state government that will pro
mulgate the new code. The question thus becomes whether the judici
ary or the legislature should be that promulgating body.
The Federal Rules of Evidence, though originally suggested by
the United States Supreme Court, were eventually enacted into law as
a statute by the Congress. 434 The federal rules are also the basis of the
Uniform Code of Evidence, promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 43S Since this is the case,
430. Berger, supra note 234, at 270.
431. There have been concerns expressed about ceding expanded discretion in the
admission or exclusion of evidence to elected trial judges. See id. at 263. Given the elabo
rate nomination process (through the Judicial Nominating Committee and the Governor's
Office) and confirmation process (through the Governor's Council) in Massachusetts for its
appointed trial judges, this should not be a problem. See MASS. CONST. pi. 2, ch. 2, § 3,
art. 1.
432. Healy, supra note 87, at 153.
433. See supra text accompanying notes 338-47.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 253-58.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 268, 294.
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Massachusetts could adopt the federal rules in the same way it has
adopted other uniform laws. 436 Nationally, nine states, a significant
minority, have codified through legislative enactment. 437 However,
the remaining twenty-five code states have codified by court rule,438
including the four codifying New England states. 439 It is now recog
nized that the judicial branches of both the federal and state govern
ments possess general rulemaking power over evidence that is
concurrent with, if not exclusive of, the legislative branches. 440 A sec
ond question, though, is whether particular rules of evidence intrude
upon extrinsic policy issues, thus raising a separation of powers issue
under state constitutions. 441
In its announcement declining codification, the Supreme Judicial
Court made in passing two somewhat inconsistent statements bearing
on this issue. On the one hand, there was concern that if the proposed
Massachusetts rules were adopted, "there would have to be careful
coordination with the Legislature to repeal, revise, or modify many
statutes which deal with the admissibility and effect of evidence."442
On the other hand, however, the court noted "the continued and his
toric role of the courts in developing principles of law relating to evi
dence."443 Which branch of the commonwealth's government is the
appropriate branch to codify its law of evidence?
The answer is not clear from the express provisions of the state
constitution itself. Under the separation of governmental depart
ments, the constitution provides that "the legislative department shall
never exercise the ... judicial powers ... [and] the judicia[ry] shall
never exercise the legislative ... powers."444 However, in the section
of the constitution dealing with the judicial power, there is no mention
of rulemaking by the court.44S Under the legislative power, there is
436. Massachusetts has adopted by statute numerous unifoqn laws suggested by the
National Conference, including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 1-101 to 9-507 (1990 & Supp. 1991)
(adopting the Uniform Commercial Code); ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (adopting the Uniform Contri
bution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act); ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (adopting the Uniform Arbitration
Act); ch. 109A, §§ 1-13 (adopting the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
437. See supra text accompanying note 286.
438. See supra text accompanying note 288.
439. See supra text accompanying note 287.
440. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1351.
441. Id. at 1351-54.
442. SJC Announcement, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
443. Id. (emphasis added).
444. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30.
445. See id. pt. 2, ch. 3, arts. 1-5.
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express authority in the legislature to "erect and constitute ... courts
... for the hearing, trying, and determining of all ... crimes ... causes
and things."446 And the legislature is also given the authority to enact
"all manner of wholesome and reasonable ... laws ... , not repugnant
or contrary to this constitution, . . . for the good and welfare of this
commonwealth,"447 including "new laws, as the common good may
require."448 The legislature certainly has enacted numerous "new" ev
idence statutes, mostly in the areas of presumptions,449 privileges,450
and hearsay exceptions,451 but in other areas as well. 452
By general statute, the state legislature also has granted rulemak
ing authority to the Supreme Judicial Court for the superintendence of
inferior courts, including the power to "issue such ... rules as may be
necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice ... [and] the im
provement of administration of such courtS."453 Again, by general
statute, the legislature has granted rulemaking authority to the
Supreme Judicial and Massachusetts Superior Courts to "promulgate
uniform codes of rules, consistent with law, for regulating the practice
... of such courts in cases not expressly provided for by law, for the
following purpose[]: . . . [c]onducting trials. "454
It thus would seem that the court's rulemaking authority is de
rived only through statutes enacted by the legislature under the latter's
constitutional authority. However, the Supreme Judicial Court has
held that although the court's inherent powers may be recognized by
statute, they exist without statutory authorization and cannot be re
stricted or abolished by the legislature without violating constitutional
provisions governing separation of powers.455 While steering clear of
clashes over separation of powers in the evidence area,456 the court
446. Id. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. 3.
447. Id. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. 4.
448. Id. pt. I, art. 22.
449. See, for example, the hundreds of statutory presumptions under "Evidence-
Presumptions" in MASS. GEN. L. 1991 GENERAL INDEX, D-I, at 258-59 (1991).
450. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 233, § 20 (1990) (spousal testimonial privilege); id.
§ 20A (priest/penitent privilege); id. § 20B (patient/psychotherapist privilege); id. § 20J
(sexual assault victim/counselor privilege).
451. See. e.g., id. §§ 65-66 (certain statements of deceased persons); id. § 78 (certain
business records); id. § 79 (certain hospital records).
452. See. e.g., id. § 20 (incompetency of certain children to testify against their par
ents); id. § 21 (impeachment of witness by prior criminal conviction); id. § 79A (authenti
cation of certain public records).
453. Id. ch. 211, § 3.
454. Id. ch. 213, § 3.
455. Brach v. Chief Justice of Dist. Court Dep't, 437 N.E.2d 164 (Mass. 1982) (inter
preting Article 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution).
456. See, e.g., Petition for the Promulgation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confi
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also has held that an express grant of power in the state constitution to
one branch of government "necessarily controls over the more general
provisions of" the separation of powers article. 457
Most of the commentators have stated a preference for judicial
rather than legislative promulgation of a codified system of evi
dence. 458 This preference is generally based upon the fact that judges
have more expertise regarding appropriate admission and exclusion of
evidence, more flexibility in drafting procedures, and a more amenable
amendment process than their legislative counterparts. 459 There also
have been predictable difficulties in both the legislative enactment and
the judicial interpretation of statutory evidence codes. 460
Not surprisingly, in a number of states, even in New England,461
conflicts have arisen between the legislative and judicial branches re
garding rulemaking authority,462 including the adoption of an evi
dence code.463 However, there also have been some instances of
remarkable cooperation between branches, especially with respect to
the effect of inconsistent evidence rules contained in prior law464 once
codification occurs.465
Cooperation also should be possible in Massachusetts. 466 The ar
eas of evidence law regarding presumptions and privileges are proba
bly the areas in which the legislature would most resent court
intrusion, as both areas involve policy issues extrinsic to the trial pro
cess. Given the traditionally active involvement of the legislature in
each area, the Supreme Judicial Court might defer to that branch in
dential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Mass. 1985) ("We do not address the question
whether this court has the power to promulgate a rule creating a [news] reporter's privilege
... [because] we conclude that, even if this court does have the power ... , it should not be
exercised in the present circumstance.").
457. Barnes v. Secretary of Admin., 586 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Mass. 1992).
458. See Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354; Tollison, supra note 234, at 65.
459. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354.
460. See Whinery, supra note 234, at 204-08 (relating Oklahoma's experience).
461. See supra note 287.
462. See, e.g., Wroth, supra note 234, at 1349 n.265.
463. See Paul Giannelli, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The General Assem
bly, Evidence, and Rulemaking, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 16,24-27 (1978).
464. See generally JOSEPH & SALTZBURG, supra note 285.
465. In Maine, for example, the state legislature authorized the state's highest court
to prescribe rules of evidence, thus avoiding any doubt about the applicability of prior,
more general rule-enabling acts and superseding all laws in conflict with such prescribed
rules. Field, supra note 236, at 203 nn.6-7.
466. For a "model" of judicial/legislative cooperation in the enactment of a code of
evidence, see Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354-66.
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both areas. 467
Regarding presumptions, the original Proposed Massachusetts
Rules attempted a detailed approach to presumptions which varied
radically from the federal rule and redefined presumption-like con
cepts from existing Massachusetts law. 468 A better approach for a new
advisory committee might be to follow the federal rule more closely,469
but to consult with appropriate legislative committee chairpeople re
garding the level of sensitivity legislators have toward preserving ex
isting statutory concepts. The advisory committee also could explore
the divergent approaches to presumptions of other codifying states,470
since the divergence over the actual content of presumption rules in
codifying states has already punctured any substantive "uniformity"
in the presumption area nationwide.
Since the approach of the codifying states is similarly diver
gent,471 there is similar freedom for a new advisory committee devel
oping privilege rules. However, Massachusetts privileges, except for
attorney-client,472 historically have been a matter of legislative rather
than judicial creation. 473 The Supreme Iudicial Court has tended to
defer to the legislature on matters of privilege474 and disqualification
(even where it disagrees with the policy decision involved)47S and
therefore tends to decline the opportunity to create new privileges by
467. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1365. Tennessee, which codified the rules of evidence
effective January I, 1990, followed this approach. See Banks, supra note 234, at 295, 335.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
469. See supra text accompanying notes 259-63.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 297-302.
471. See supra text accompanying notes 303-08.
472. See LIACOS, supra note 2, at 182-86.
473. See. e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 112, § 135 (1990) ("Social Worker-Client Privi
lege"); id. ch. 233, § 20A ("Priest-Penitent Privilege"); id. § 20B ("Patient-Psychotherapist
Privilege").
474. See. e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1205-06 (Mass.
1983) (stating that while "[w]e are, of course, free to identify a privilege of a child not to
testify against his or her parent ... , courts have tended to leave the creation of evidentiary
privileges to legislative determination"), cen. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). The legislature
did thereafter adopt a limited parent-child testimonial disqualification. See MASS. GEN. L.
ch. 233, § 20 (1990) (as added by 1986 Mass. Acts 145). See a/so Petition for the Promul
gation of Rules Regarding Protection of Confidential News Sources, 479 N.E.2d 154, 157
(Mass. 1985) (deferring to legislature on a reporter's privilege rule).
While codification often results in the restatement of existing privileges, several com
mentators believe the expansion of privilege rules is particularly appropriate for the legisla
ture, since the expansion of privilege tends to restrict the jury's access to otherwise relevant
evidence for a policy reason generally extrinsic to any individual piece of litigation. See
Field, supra note 236, at 213; Tollison, supra note 234, at 61.
475. See, e.g., Gallagher V. Goldstein, 524 N.E.2d 53, 54-55 (Mass. 1988) (comment
ing on Massachusetts statute prohibiting admission into evidence of contents of private
marital communication).
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common-law development. 476 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 encom
passes deference to the legislature while retaining for the jUdiciary the
power, but not the mandate, to evolve individual privileges by com
mon-law development. Thus, the actual federal rule approach,477 fol
lowed by fourteen other codifying states,478 may make sense here. 479
One would hope that the Massachusetts legislature and court
could avoid the unseemly "showdown" over separation of powers
which marred the federal rules project in the early 1970's.480 While
the Supreme Judicial Court was concerned in its declination of the
proposed Massachusetts rules about the "careful coordination" needed
with the legislature over pre-existing evidence provisions, a parallel
need for careful coordination certainly did not stop the movement to
adopt a federal rules based model for the state's civil procedure sys
tem. Indeed, that movement resulted in a "coordinated" statute that
covered literally hundreds of pre-existing provisions. 481 The same cre
ative and cooperative spirit between branches of government should be
observed with the codification of evidence in Massachusetts. 482
B.

Public Notice
If codification occurs via the legislative process, the product is, by

definition, the will of the people who elected those legislators. How
ever, if codification occurs primarily through judicial rulemaking in a
jurisdiction like Massachusetts, which appoints rather than elects its
judges, concerns may arise that the process was "counter
majoritarian."483 The composition of the advisory committee can
ameliorate this concern somewhat. 484 In addition, any set of suggested
rules should be published both in the lawyers' newspaper485 and also
in the official Massachusetts Reporter,486 so that the suggested rules
476. See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (Mass. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
477. See supra text accompanying notes 264-67.
478. See supra text accompanying note 303.
479. But see Patrick, supra note 234, at 690 (noting that "[c]odifying the rules of
privilege would make them readily accessible and easily ascertainable ... [and] would
provide an opportunity for reform of certain privilege rules").
480. See supra text accompanying notes 250-58.
481. See 1973 Mass. Acts 1114, §§ 1-351 (approved Nov. 3D, 1973; effective July I,
1974 by § 351).
482. Tollison, supra note 234, at 63; Healy, supra note 87, at 153.
483. Wroth, supra note 234, at 1354.
484. See supra text accompanying note 347.
485. See supra note 2.
486. This approach was followed by the Federal Rules Decisions reporter for the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 253-55.
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can be read immediately and later researched conveniently and cited
effectively. Should the court wish to comment on the new suggested
rules, it should ensure that its request for briefs and arguments oper
ates less as an "invitation" and more as a "command performance," so
that all segments of the bar are before the court actively and certainly,
rather than voting silently and, therefore, ambiguously.487
C.

Implementation

The transition to the rules of civil procedure took eight years to
complete, beginning with the Massachusetts Superior Court in 1974
and ending with the Massachusetts Land Court in 1982. 488 To some
extent, this long period was due to the extensive coordination required
to transform the entirety of civil litigation, from complaint to execu
tion, to a federal rules model.
However, the implementation of a federal rules evidence code
should be easier, since it deals primarily only with trial rather than
pre-trial or post-trial stages of a case. While there may have to be a
transitional rule similar to the one used for the Massachusetts Supe
rior Court in 1974,489 there should be a single effective date mandated
for all courts of the commonwealth, thus requiring all participants in
both civil and criminal cases to adapt to the new rules quickly.490
There should be scheduled seminars for judges,491 court clerks, and
lawyers who may not be acquainted with the federal rules model to
learn the structure and content of the rules. 492 To cushion the initial
impact of the new code, the effective date should be during the sum
mer months, when judges, lawyers, and clerks may have a better op
portunity to become familiar with it. 493
487. This concern was noted ten years ago, when the Boston Bar Association's Civil
Procedure Committee became the Association's de facto commenting body on the Pro
posed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence even though that committee had little expertise in
those rules that would affect criminal matters. See BBA Brief, supra note 18, at 5.
488. See 1973 Mass. Acts 1114, supra note 481; Hennessey, supra note 98, at 7.
489. See MASS. R. CIV. P. lA ("Transitional Rule for Litigation in Progress on July
1, 1974").
490. Healy, supra note 87, at 153.
491. See Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 186. When a state code is enacted, and· even
when it is just being discussed, the evidence awareness and educational interest of bench
and bar rises. See id. at 186-87 n.53.
492. In the fall of 1982, the author participated as a speaker in an orientation pro
gram on the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Many of the attorneys at the
program attended because they were not conversant with the federal-rules model. Most of
them expressed their satisfaction with the rationality and usability of the rules. Cf.
Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 193-94 (noting that opponents of codification viewed the fed
eral rules as more complicated than they have proved to be).
493. Healy, supra note 87, at 153.
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Interpretation

The year after the adoption of the federal-model rules of proce
dure for the Massachusetts Superior Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court decided Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. v. Superior
Court .494 In Rollins, the court stated: "This court having adopted
comprehensive rules of civil procedure in substantially the same form
as the earlier Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the adjudged construc
tion theretofore given to the Federal Rules is to be given to our rules,
absent compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in
content. "49S
Other states codifying their evidence laws on a federal rules
model have Rollins-like decisions on interpreting the new state
code. 496 If the new Massachusetts code is promulgated by the judici
ary rather than passed by the legislature, there seems to be no reason
why the Supreme Judicial Court could not accelerate the Rollins-like
approach to interpretation by including Rollins-like language in the
order of promulgation itself.

E. Supplementation
Commentators decry the absence of a continuing advisory com
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evidence to monitor interpretation of
the code and offer suggested supplementation. 497 There is a current
effort to petition the United States Supreme Court and the Judicial
Conference of the United States to create such a continuing commit
tee,498 and several commentators have recommended a state-level
committee for codifying states. 499 A continuing committee,sao perhaps
comprised as suggested above, would make sense for Massachusetts,
particularly during the "break-in" period after the codification and
legislative coordination become effective, since no statutory "clean
494. 330 N.E.2d S14 (Mass. 1975).
495. [d. at S18.
496. See. e.g., Laske v. State, 694 P.2d 536, 53S (Okla. erim. App. 1985) ("Since the
[Oklahoma] Evidence Code was patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence with the
intent that practice in both state and federal courts be uniform, it is useful to look to federal
interpretations."). See also Whinery, supra note 234, at 244-46.
497. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 234, at 277.
498. See Letter from 75 law professors to Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Judge
Robert E. Keeton, Judge William T. Hodges, and Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr. (Feb. 11, 1992)
(on file with author).
499. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 65-66; Whinery, supra note 234, at 257-5S. An
unanswered, and usually unasked, question is how the state-level committees would be
funded. See Tollison, supra note 234, at 66 n.90.
500. See supra text accompanying note 347.
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up," however well-coordinated, can be flawless. 501
F.

Reality

The rapid acceptance of the Federal Rules of Evidence stands in
sharp contrast to the fate of earlier codes. s02 The reason for this is not
that the federal model is inherently a better code, nor that earlier ef
forts were scuttled unfairly, nor that the attitudes of the practicing bar
have changed dramatically. The federal rules were enacted because
the federal jUdiciary received them with "open arms, not a 'show-me
why' attitude."s03 While codification of evidence law may make sense
for Massachusetts, it probably will actually occur only if those in
volved in the litigation process, both from the bench and the bar, em
brace a second codification effort actively and enthusiastically.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The effort between 1976 and 1982 to codify evidence law through
the Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence was unsuccessful,
partly because of the content of the code itself and partly because of
the reluctance of a majority of the Supreme Judicial Court to adopt
that or any other code. Given the widespread adoption of federal
model codifications during the intervening decade, codification for the
commonwealth is now appropriate for reasons of uniformity, rational
ity and modernity, competency and accessibility, and certainty and
flexibility. It is hoped that the current judiciary, legislature, and bar
will appreciate these reasons and join together in bringing the benefits
of codification to Massachusetts evidence law.

501.
502.
503.

Wroth, supra note 234, at 1360.
Patrick, supra note 234, at 672.
Saltzburg, supra note 234, at 183-84.

